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Abstract
With significant advances in wired and wireless technologies and also increased
shrinking in the size of VLSI circuits, many devices have become very large because
they need to contain several large units. This large number of gates and in turn
large number of transistors causes the devices to be more prone to faults. These
faults specially in sensitive and critical applications may cause serious failures and
hence should be avoided.
On the other hand, some critical applications such as cryptosystems may also
be prone to deliberately injected faults by malicious attackers. Some of these faults
can produce erroneous results that can reveal some important secret information of
the cryptosystems. Furthermore, yield factor improvement is always an important
issue in VLSI design and fabrication processes. Digital systems such as cryptosys-
tems and digital signal processors usually contain finite field operations. Therefore,
error detection and correction of such operations have become an important issue
recently.
In most of the work reported so far, error detection and correction are ap-
plied using redundancies in space (hardware), time, and/or information (coding
theory). In this work, schemes based on these redundancies are presented to de-
tect errors in important finite field arithmetic operations resulting from hardware
faults. Finite fields are used in a number of practical cryptosystems and channel
encoders/decoders. The schemes presented here can detect errors in arithmetic
operations of finite fields represented in different bases, including polynomial, dual
and/or normal basis, and implemented in various architectures, including bit-serial,
bit-parallel and/or systolic arrays.
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“A fault-tolerant system is one that can continue the correct performance of its
specified tasks in the presence of hardware and/or software faults. Fault detection
is the process of recognizing that a fault has occurred. Fault detection is often
required before any recovery procedure can be implemented” [51].
Recently a number of schemes have been developed for the detection and/or
correction of errors in hardware implementation of some arithmetic operations [24,
55–57], which have applications in cryptography [9,10,14–16,20,32–36,68,69], deep
space channel coding [66], VLSI testing [52]. The main reasons for increased interest
in such schemes are as follows:
• Having correct functionality in the presence of faults: Digital systems that
require large number of circuits for their implementation can be more prone
to produce erroneous results simply because of the increase in the probability
that one of the circuits may become faulty while in use. As a result, for
1
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sensitive or critical applications large digital systems are generally designed
with some kind of mechanism to provide correct functionality or to detect
errors.
• Avoiding fault-based attacks [13,29,63]: Fault attacks are based on injecting
some faults into a cryptosystem and observing any leak of secret information.
Boneh et al. presented the first fault-based attack [15, 16]. Their attack has
been applied to some public key cryptosystems such as RSA and the Ra-
bin signature scheme. Since RSA is usually implemented using the Chinese
Remainder theorem (CRT), having one correct signature and one faulty sig-
nature of the same message can lead to the modulus factorization. In [11],
Biham and Shamir presented a fault-based side channel cryptanalysis of DES.
They recovered the last round key by less than 200 cipher texts and then they
found the round key of the second-last round and so on. They extended their
work to show that it could uncover the structure of an unknown cryptosystem
in a smart card. Anderson and Kuhn [3] introduced some other fault based
attacks using fault injection into instruction memory of a smart card and by
overwriting specific memory locations of a smart card.
One technique to detect errors in hardware implementation is on-line testing or
concurrent error detection (CED). CED is used to concurrently test a system while
the system is operating normally [26,53,60]. CED can test the circuit at full oper-
ating speed without stopping the system or switching it to test mode. Accordingly,
CED can detect transient faults, which may not be detected in off-line testing, since
they may not occur in test mode. Furthermore, concurrent error correction (CEC)
can offer some advantages such as higher yield factors and increased availability in
addition to the above mentioned advantages for CED.
To detect or correct errors, some kinds of redundancy are usually required: hard-
ware, time, and/or information [53]. This thesis focuses mainly on the detection
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and/or correction of random errors in extension field arithmetic operations. The
cause of such errors can be natural faults. Moreover, some faults deliberately in-
jected by attackers may cause random errors, e.g., some faults resulting from electro
magnetic interferences (EMIs). It is worth mentioning that some random errors in
a number of hardware based cryptosystems or their arithmetic accelerators can be
detected at an upper level operation, e.g., in elliptic curve cryptography (ECC),
if a point leaves the curve it can be easily detected by point verification [10, 20].
This is, however, not always possible. In the case of ECC, a fault may move a
point to another point without leaving the curve and this has been exploited in the
so-called sign change fault attack1 [14]. As a result, some kind of mechanisms for
error detection in finite field operations can be quite important in cryptography as
well as other critical applications where finite field operations of various sizes are
used.
Although the schemes proposed in this thesis does not provide a complete so-
lution to the problem of deliberately injected faults, they may reduce the success
probability of an attack. This is because the number of faults that can be injected
by an attacker is reduced to the number of faults that cannot be detected by the
scheme. Furthermore, these schemes are more suitable mainly for large finite field
arithmetic and may not be very suitable for those systems that use small finite field
operations such as GF (28) operations of AES [21].
The majority of the work of this thesis is for extended binary field multipliers
mainly because the complexity of multiplication is higher than the basic operations
such as addition and subtraction. Also, other complex finite field arithmetic op-
erations such as inversion and exponentiation over binary extension fields can be
preformed by repeated multiplications [2, 67].
1Note that a random fault may move one point on the curve to another point on the curve
with a very low probability [22].
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In order to detect and/or correct random errors in finite field operations, a number
of approaches can be considered, including:
• Using parity bits: In this approach, basically, the parity of the output is pre-
dicted and compared against its actual party. In [24], Fenn et al. presented
a concurrent error detection scheme for bit-serial multipliers, using a number
of bases for representation of fields, defined by an irreducible all-ones poly-
nomial. In [55–57], parity based error detection schemes for both bit-serial
and bit-parallel polynomial basis multipliers are presented. However, these
schemes are not generic and can detect mostly odd number of erroneous bits
and one of them can correct one bit.
• Scaling techniques: The second approach, which is also used in [27], is for
example to scale the inputs of a multiplier by a factor and at the end of the
multiplication the correctness of the result is checked by one or two divisions.
• Nonlinear techniques: One example for this approach [28] is to compute a non-
linear residue for each input of the operation and then predict the residue of
the output using these residues. To assure the correctness of the operation,
one can compare the predicted residue against the actual output residue. This
approach is expensive in terms of area and time and in turn may not be very
efficient for detecting random errors.
• Time redundancy based techniques: In this approach some methods such as
recomputing with shifted operands are used to detect errors in operations.
In [19, 41], this method is used for detecting errors in polynomial basis mul-
tipliers.
1.3 Thesis Outline 5
Additionally, a number of schemes for detecting errors in arithmetic operations
of the symmetric block ciphers are presented in [17]. These schemes are mostly
based on parity and/or residue codes.
This thesis presents a number of schemes for concurrent error detection of the
arithmetic operations over binary extension fields based on some of the above-
mentioned approaches. These schemes are more generic than previous schemes in
the sense that they can be applied to different implementations, e.g., bit-serial,
bit-parallel and/or digit-serial, and also they can be applied to different bases for
the field representation such as polynomial, dual and optimal normal bases. Addi-
tionally, the schemes presented in this thesis have high error detection capability,
e.g., based on our simulations, the majority of the schemes have a percentage of
error detection higher than 99% with a moderate amount of redundancies.
1.3 Thesis Outline
The organization of the remainder of the proposal is as follows. A brief overview
of required background is presented in Chapter 2.
Chapter 3 presents a number of schemes for detecting errors concurrently in
polynomial, dual and normal bases arithmetic operations. These schemes are based
on recomputing with shifted operands technique and are efficient for pipelined ar-
chitectures such as systolic arrays. To investigate more on this scheme, one finite
field semi-systolic multiplier is presented for each of the polynomial, dual, type I
and type II optimal normal bases. Then the CED scheme is applied to them. Ad-
ditionally, the space and time complexity of these multipliers are compared against
a number of systolic and/or semi-systolic multipliers previously published in the
literature. Furthermore, the capability of error detection of each multiplier is eval-
uated by simulation-based fault injection. The results show that having better or
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similar space and time overheads compared to a number of related previous work,
the multipliers have generally a high error detection capability, e.g., the percentage
of error detection of the scheme for the single and multiple stuck-at faults in a
polynomial basis multiplier is 100%. Finally, we also comment on how RESO can
be used for concurrent error correction to deal with transient faults.
In Chapter 4, one parity based scheme to detect multiple-bit errors in polynomial
basis multipliers is presented. In this scheme one input of the multiplier is divided
into a number of parts and a parity bit is considered for each part. To obtain a
realistic area and time overheads of the scheme, it is implemented in bit-serial and
bit-parallel fashions on FPGAs. Also, the capability of the scheme is investigated
using a theoretical analysis as well as a simulation-based fault injection. Having a
high error detection capability, this scheme produces area and time overheads lower
than dual modular redundant systems.
In Chapter 5, the parity based scheme presented in the previous chapter is ex-
tended to both inputs of the polynomial basis multiplier. This is because the errors
on the second input cannot be detected, although, the error detection capability
of the scheme, presented in previous chapter, is high, e.g., the percentage of er-
ror detection is 99.61% for eight partitions on the first input. This scheme is also
implemented on FPGAs to determine the area and time overheads of the scheme.
Moreover, the error detection capability of the scheme is evaluated by simulation-
based fault injection. This scheme has slightly better percentage of error detection
and slightly more area overhead compared to the previous scheme. In the sec-
ond part of this chapter, both parity based schemes are extended to other bases,
including dual, type I and type II normal bases.
In Chapter 6, a number of schemes based on linear codes are presented to detect
errors in polynomial basis multipliers. In the first scheme one input of the multiplier
is encoded by a generator polynomial. The correctness of the result is checked by
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decoding of the final and/or intermediate results of the multiplication. To resolve
the problem of error detection on the second input of the multiplier, a second
scheme is presented. In this scheme, both inputs of the multiplier are encoded
by two different generator polynomials. Another scheme that combines the parity
based scheme for the first input and the linear code based scheme for the second
input is presented in this chapter. This scheme basically has a lower area overhead
compared to the second scheme presented in this chapter, however, their error
detection capabilities are almost the same. These scheme are also implemented on
FPGAs and their error detection capability are evaluated by simulation-based fault
injection.
Finally, summary and conclusions of the thesis as well as directions for further
research are given in Chapter 7.
1.4 Research Contributions
Achieving an acceptable security level for hardware implementations of large dig-
ital systems specially with critical applications has received significant attention
recently. Some of these digital systems use finite field arithmetic operations such
as extension field multipliers. The major contributions of this thesis are the de-
velopment of some schemes to concurrently detect and/or correct errors in such
operations. Some specific contributions of the thesis are as follows:
• Concurrent error detection in binary extension field operations suitable for
pipelined architectures and systolic arrays. These schemes use RESO (RE-
computing with Shifted Operands) method for finite fields represented in
polynomial, dual and optimal normal bases.
• Concurrent error detection in binary extension field multipliers for general
bit-serial, digit-serial and/or bit-parallel implementations.
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– Two of the schemes, SIMP and DIMP, are based on the parity codes and
are for the finite fields represented using polynomial, dual and optimal
normal bases.
– Three other schemes, SIE, DIE and hybrid, are based on the linear codes




In this chapter, first finite fields are reviewed, secondly a number of arithmetic
operations particularly multiplication algorithms are explained, and finally a brief
introduction to fault tolerant systems is given.
2.1 Finite Fields
In this section, proofs of theorems and lemmas are omitted for brevity. For in-
terested readers there are many good texts on algebra and finite fields such as
[12, 30, 31, 42, 43, 46, 58].
Basic Definitions and Properties
Definition 2.1 A group is a set G with a binary operation ’*’ on G if it satisfies
the following conditions:
• The binary operation ’*’ is associative, i.e.,
∀a, b, c ∈ G a ∗ (b ∗ c) = (a ∗ b) ∗ c
9
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• There is an identity element e in G such that,
∀a ∈ G a ∗ e = e ∗ a = a
• There is an inverse element for each element such that,
∀a ∈ G, ∃a−1 ∈ G a ∗ a−1 = a−1 ∗ a = e
The identity element of a group and the inverse of each element of a group are
unique. Furthermore, a group is an Abelian or communicative group if ’∗’ also
satisfies the following condition:
∀a, b ∈ G a ∗ b = b ∗ a
Definition 2.2 A set F with two operations denoted by ’+’ and ’.’ is a field if it
satisfies the following conditions:
• (F, +) is an Abelian group and 0 is its identity element.
• (F∗, .) is an Abelian group and 1 is its identity element where F∗ is the set of
nonzero elements in F.
• ’.’ is distributive over ’+’, i.e., ∀a, b, c ∈ F
a.(b + c) = a.b + a.c
and
(b + c).a = b.a + c.a
Definition 2.3 A set R with two operations denoted by ’+’ and ’.’ is a ring if it
satisfies all conditions of a field except the condition that each element should have
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a multiplicative inverse. In other words, the elements of a ring may not have a
multiplicative inverse.
Definition 2.4 A field that contains a finite number of elements is called a finite
field (also known as Galois field).
Definition 2.5 The number of elements in a Galois field is called the order of the
field and a Galois field with the order of q is denoted by GF (q).
Definition 2.6 Let a be an element in GF (q). Then the smallest positive integer
m is called characteristic of the field such that ma = 0.
Theorem 2.1 The characteristic of any finite field is prime.
Theorem 2.2 In a Galois field, the order of the field is a prime or a power of a
prime.




q if q is prime;
p if q is a power of a prime p.
Definition 2.7 The order of a nonzero element a ∈ GF (q) is the smallest positive
integer n such that,
an ≡ 1
Theorem 2.3 Let a be a nonzero element of GF (q). Then aq−1 ≡ 1.
Using Theorem 2, the inverse of any nonzero element a could be computed by
a−1 ≡ aq−2.
Definition 2.8 In a finite field GF (q), a nonzero element a is primitive if its order
is q − 1.
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Definition 2.9 V is a vector space over F with multiplication operation ’.’: F ×
V → V if for all a, b ∈ F and v, w ∈ V :
1. (V, +) is a commutative group
2. a(v + w) = av + aw
3. (a + b)v = av + bv
4. (ab)v = a(bv)
5. 1v = v
Elements of F and V are called scalars and vectors, respectively. ’+’ is called vector
addition and ’.’ is called scalar multiplication.
Polynomials





i = a0 + a1x + . . . anx
n
where ai ∈ GF (p) and n, the degree of F (x), is a nonnegative integer. Polynomial
F (x) is called monic if an = 1.
Definition 2.10 A polynomial F (x) over GF (p) is said to be irreducible if it can-
not be written as the product of some lower degree polynomials over GF (p).
Definition 2.11 Suppose a polynomial F (x) over GF (p) which F (0) 6= 0. The
order (or period) of F (x) is the least positive integer t such that F (x)|xt − 1.
Definition 2.12 Let F (x) be a polynomial of degree m over GF (p). Polynomial
F (x) is said to be a primitive polynomial if its order is pm − 1.
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Definition 2.13 A polynomial F (x) is said to be an all-ones polynomial (AOP) if
all of its coefficients are one.
Construction and Representation of GF (pm)
To construct GF (pm) the following theorem can be applied.
Theorem 2.4 Let F (x) be an irreducible polynomial of degree m over GF (p).
Then all polynomials over GF (p) of degree less than m form a finite field GF (pm)
of order pm if addition and multiplication are performed modulo F (x).
F (x) is referred to as the field defining polynomial.
Definition 2.14 Let F and G be two fields and F ⊂ G. Then F is called a subfield
of G and G is called an extension field of F .
For example, GF (pm) is an extension field of GF (p).
GF (pm) is a vector space of dimension m over GF (p). Thus, the basis of
vector space GF (pm) could be any set of m linearly independent elements, e.g.,
{x0, x1, . . . xm−1}. A linear combination of these elements is as follows:
A = a0x0 + a1x1 + . . . am−1xm−1
where ai ∈ GF (p).
There are some well-known bases for representation of extension fields such as
canonical (polynomial) basis, normal basis, dual basis and triangular basis. Below
we introduce the first three bases.
Definition 2.15 Let x be the root of an irreducible polynomial F (x) over GF (p)
of degree m, i.e., F (x) = 0. Canonical (polynomial) basis is defined as the following
set:
{1, x, x2, . . . xm−1}
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Hereafter, this basis is called polynomial basis (PB).







The dual basis (DB) of the polynomial basis {1, x, x2, . . . xm−1} is a basis







0, i 6= j;
1, otherwise.
(2.1)
Definition 2.17 A normal basis (NB) of GF (pm) has the following form:
{z, zp, zp
2
, . . . zp
m−1
}
where z ∈ GF (pm).
2.2 Field Arithmetic Operations
In this section, arithmetic operations except addition and subtraction which are
considered to be trivial are briefly explained. Two arithmetic operations, i.e., mul-
tiplication and inversion over extension fields are discussed in the two following
sections. It will be shown that the arithmetic operations such as inversion, divi-
sion, exponentiation can be computed using repeated multiplications. We will use
polynomial basis for representation of the elements of the binary extension field
GF (2m).
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2.2.1 Multiplication over GF (2m)
General Bit-level Multiplications
Suppose that A, B ∈ GF (2m) and F (x) is the modulus (defining polynomial of the



















i mod F (x)
= (b0A + b1xA + · · ·+ bm−1x
m−1A) mod F (x)
(2.2)
According to (2.2), bit-level algorithm of multiplication from low bit to high bit
is given in Algorithm 2.1.
Algorithm 2.1 Low-to-high bit-level multiplication in GF (2m) [31]
Input: A, B, F (x)
Output: C = AB mod F (x)
D := A
C := 0
For i = 0 to m− 1 do {
C := C + D.bi
D := xD mod F (x)
}
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Equation (2.2) can also be written as follows:
C = AB mod F (x)
= A(bm−1x
m−1 + bm−2x
m−2 + · · ·+ b0) mod F (x)
= (. . . (Abm−1x + bm−2)x + . . . )x + Ab0 mod F (x)
= (. . . (Abm−1x mod F (x) + bm−2)x mod F (x) + . . . )x mod F (x) + Ab0
(2.3)
Based on (2.3), an algorithm for bit-level multiplication from high bit to low bit
of element B is given in Algorithm 2.2.
Algorithm 2.2 High-to-low bit-level multiplication in GF (2m) [31]
Input: A, B, F (x)
Output: C = AB mod F (x)
C := A.bm−1
For i = m− 2 to 0 do {
C := xC mod F (x)
C := C + A.bi
}
An advantage of the second algorithm is that D, which is a register in hardware
implementation, is not needed.
Bit-Serial Multiplications
Let A ∈ GF (2m) and F (x) be the defining polynomial. X = xA can be computed
as:
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A X = xASR
Figure 2.1: SR module
Figure 2.1 shows a module whose input and output are A and X, respectively.
This module basically performs a shift operation and a reduction operation. Hence,
it is hereafter referred to as Shift-and-Reduce or SR module.
Multiplication of A, B ∈ GF (2m) can be written as:
C = AB = A(bm−1x
m−1 + bm−2x
m−2 + · · ·+ b0)
= (bm−1x
m−1A + bm−2x
m−2A + · · ·+ b0A)
= (bm−1A
(m−1) + bm−2A
(m−2) + · · ·+ b0A
(0))
(2.5)
where A(0) = A and A(i) = xA(i−1).
Since GF (2m) is a vector space, in (2.5), ’.’ is a scalar multiplication and ’+’ is
a vector addition [see Definition 2.9]. Additionally, bit bi is the i
th coordinate of B.
Figure 2.2 shows a low-to-high bit-serial multiplier where D is initialized with A.
Scalar multiplication and vector addition of a bit-serial multiplier are bitwise-AND
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and bitwise-XOR, respectively. Modules that perform scalar multiplication and
vector addition are hereafter referred to as SM module and VA module, respectively.
These two modules and the SR module discussed earlier are the main components of
a PB multiplier. In accordance with (2.5) and using these three main components,













Figure 2.2: Low-to-high bit-serial multiplication
Bit-parallel Multiplications
According to (2.5), we can implement multiplication in a bit-parallel fashion. Fig-
ure 2.3 shows a bit-parallel multiplication. A bit-parallel multiplication needs
(m− 1) SR modules, m scalar multiplications and (m− 1) vector additions.
Digit-Serial Multiplications
Another method to implement a PB multiplier is to combine the above-mentioned
implementations. In other words, instead of computing the multiplication of input


























Figure 2.3: Bit-parallel multiplication
A by one bit of input B per clock cycle (like bit-serial implementations), one can
multiply A by a number of bits of B (i.e., a digit of B). This implementation is
referred to as digit-serial implementation.
2.2.2 Inversion over GF (2m)
There are several algorithms for inversion [31] which are based on one of the fol-
lowing methods.
1. Repeated squaring-and-multiplications in extension field GF (2m)
2. Use of extended Euclidean algorithm over some subfield of GF (2)
3. Solution of a system of linear equations over some subfield of GF (2)
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We consider the first two methods. The former is based on Theorem 2.3, such that
∀a ∈ GF (q = 2m) :
aq−1 = 1
a−1 = aq−2
The latter is discussed below.
Extended Euclidean Algorithm (EEA) Based Inversion
Let A(x) ∈ GF (2m) and F (x) be the defining polynomial of the field. We want to
find B(x) such that,
A(x)B(x) = 1 mod F (x).
Since gcd(F (x), A(x)) = 1, B(x) can be obtained using EEA (Algorithm 2.3):
A(x)B(x) + F (x)C(x) = 1
Algorithm 2.3 Extended Euclidean algorithm [31]
Input: F (x) and A(x) 6= 0
Output: B(x)
Step1:
R(−1)(x) = F (x), R(0)(x) = A(x)




i = i + 1
Q(i)(x) = ⌊R(i−2)(x)/R(i−1)(x)⌋
R(i)(x) = R(i−2)(x)−Q(i)(x)R(i−1)(x)
U (i)(x) = U (i−2)(x)−Q(i)(x)U (i−1)(x)
}while (R(i)(x) 6= 0)
Step3:
B(x) = U (i−1)(x)
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It is worth mentioning that in addition to inversion, two other arithmetic oper-









where n is a non-negative integer.
2.3 Fault Tolerant Systems
2.3.1 Faults
Faults can be investigated at different levels, including gate-level and architecture-
level. Below we give brief descriptions of gate and architecture level faults.
Gate-level faults can be categorized as open faults, short (bridging) faults, and
stuck-at faults. An example for an open fault is a disconnected wire. The discon-
nected wire may keep its previous value. Figure 2.4 shows a circuit with an open
fault which the gate output is disconnected. Assuming that the value of the circuit
before disconnection was 1, the correct output (c) and the faulty output (c′) for
different values of the gate inputs are presented in Table 2.1. Clearly, the error
can be modelled by a bit-flip (ec = c ⊕ c′) in a higher level of abstraction such as
architecture-level .
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Table 2.1: Open fault table
a b c c′ ec
0 0 0 1 1
0 1 0 1 1
1 0 0 1 1
1 1 1 1 0
Similarly, Figure 2.5 shows two circuits, which one of them is fault free and the
other one has two stuck-at faults. Table 2.2 presents the expected correct output
values (d and f), the faulty output values (d′ and f ′) and the multiple-bit flip errors
that model the stuck-at faults (ed and ef ).













Table 2.2: Stuck-at fault table
a b c d f d′ f ′ ed ef
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1
0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1
1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0
1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0
1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0
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2.3.2 Fault Tolerant Techniques
For having fault tolerance or detection capability, one can use some forms of re-
dundancies. There are three common types of redundancies [51] used in practice:
1) Hardware redundancy, 2) Time redundancy and 3) Information redundancy.
An example for hardware redundancy is a dual modular redundant (DMR)
system. In this system, two identical modules are functioning simultaneously and
their results are compared. Any difference between the results indicates an error.
A DMR has (more than) 100% hardware redundancy. On the other hand, one
system with one module can perform the computations twice and then compare
the results. This system has 100% time redundancy and clearly some hardware
redundancies for storing the intermediate result and comparing the results. In the
following section, some forms of information redundancies are briefly explained. For
further information, references [1, 37, 42, 51] are recommended.
2.3.3 Information Redundancy
Definition 2.18 A code is a set of rules by which some information or data is
represented.
For example, a code can be 4-bit representation of each digit of a number which is
called binary coded decimal (BCD).
Definition 2.19 A collection of bits which is representing some information or
data using a code is said to be a codeword. The bits are called digits if they are
numbers. A binary code contains only 0 and 1 digits which are called bits.
Definition 2.20 A codeword is valid if it satisfies all of the rules of the code.
For example, ’1001’ is a valid BCD , but ’1100’ is invalid. In the following a number
of special codes are reviewed.
2.3 Fault Tolerant Systems 24
Parity Codes
The simplest form of a code is the parity code.
Definition 2.21 Let A = (ak−1, ak−2, · · · , a1, a0) be a k-bit message. The single-













mod 2; odd parity
(2.6)
For a hardware implementation of the above even (or odd) parity generator, k
(or k + 1) XOR gates are needed1.
The single-bit parity code can detect any single-bit error but it cannot correct
it. Moreover, such codes can detect any odd number of erroneous bits, since they
change an odd parity codeword to an even parity one and vice versa. Hereafter,
parity is used instead of even parity for brevity.
Arithmetic Codes
One useful code especially for arithmetic operations are arithmetic codes [51]. The
data are encoded before the operations are performed. The result should be a valid
codeword, otherwise, an error is signalled.
Let b and c be the data and ’*’ be the operation and A() be the encoding
function. Then the arithmetic code must be invariant to the operation, i.e.,
A(b ∗ c) = A(b) ∗ A(c)
.
• The simplest arithmetic code is called AN code. It is constructed by multi-
plying a constant A by a data word N . AN codes are invariant to addition
1Precisely, for the odd parity generator, k XOR gates and one NOT gate are needed.
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and subtraction, but, they are variant to multiplication. In case of binary
codes, A should not be a power of 2. Let N = (an−1, an−2, · · · , a1, a0) be
multiplied by A = 2i. AN is:
(an−1, an−2, · · · , a1, a0, 0, · · · , 0)
where i zeroes appended to original N . Let any bit before the appended
zeroes, i.e., ai’s, be flipped. Then the code cannot detect the fault, since it is
still divisible by 2a.
One of the well-known AN codes is 3N code which can be efficiently con-
structed by addition of 2N and N . It increases the size of original message
by 2 bits.
• Residue code is another type of arithmetic codes. For constructing a residue
codeword, the original information is divided by a constant which is called
modulus. Then the remainder, which is called the residue, is appended to the
original information. This code is invariant to modular addition.
Let the size of modulus and original information be m bits and n bits, respec-
tively. The size of the residue codeword is m + n bits.
• Inverse residue code is a modification of the residue code. Inverse residue is
calculated as M − R, where M is the modulus and R is the residue of orig-
inal information. The inverse residue codeword is constructed by appending
inverse residue to the original information.
The advantage of such codes is their better tolerance in presence of repeated-
use faults. A repeated-use fault is one that is encountered multiple times
before the code is checked, since the hardware is used multiple times before
checking [51].
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Duplication Codes
In duplication codes, a codeword consists of completely duplicating of original infor-
mation. The detection capability of such codes are the best. Since the information
are assumed to be fault free if both parts are the same. The main disadvantage of
such codes is its 100% informational overhead. But in many applications such as
data transmission or memory, in addition to 100% informational overhead, there is
a 100% redundancy in hardware and/or time. A variation of a basic duplication
code is to complement the duplicated portion of the codeword. This is a major
advantage when the original information and its duplicate must pass through the
same way or must be processed by the same hardware.
Chapter 3
Concurrent Error Detection Using
RESO
This chapter presents a number of schemes for detecting errors concurrently in
polynomial, dual and normal bases arithmetic operations. The schemes presented
in this chapter are based on recomputing with shifted operands (RESO) technique
and are efficient for pipelined architectures such as systolic arrays. To investigate
more on this scheme, one finite field semi-systolic multiplier is presented for each
of the polynomial, dual, type I and type II optimal normal bases. Then the CED
scheme is applied to them. Additionally, the space and time complexities of these
multipliers are compared against a number of systolic and/or semi-systolic multi-
pliers previously published in the literature. Furthermore, the capability of error
detection of each multiplier is evaluated by simulation-based fault injection. The
results show that having better or similar space and time overheads compared to a
number of related previous work, the multipliers have generally a high error detec-
tion capability, e.g., the percentage of error detection of the scheme for the single
and multiple stuck-at faults in a polynomial basis multiplier is 100%. Finally, we
also comment on how RESO can be used for concurrent error correction to deal
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with transient faults.
The organization of the remainder of this chapter is as follows. In Section 3.1,
the RESO method is reviewed. The concurrent error detection strategy is pre-
sented in Section 3.2. General pipelined architectures, which are suitable for these
schemes, along with an overhead analysis are given in Section 3.3. In Section 3.4,
the CED scheme is investigated with more details for polynomial, dual and normal
bases multipliers. The error detection capability of the scheme is then evaluated
in Section 3.5. In Section 3.6, some comments on the concurrent error correction
strategy are given. Finally, Section 3.7 gives a summary of the chapter.
This work also appeared in [5].
3.1 RESO Method
REcomputing with Shifted Operands (RESO) is a technique for concurrent error
detection (CED) in arithmetic and logic units introduced by Patel and Fung in
[48, 49]. This technique is based on time redundancy. Suppose x and f(x) are the
input and output of a computation unit f , respectively. Also, suppose E and D
are two functions such that D(f(E(x))) = f(x). Now, we store the result of the
computation of f(x) (first step) in a register and compare it with the result of the
computation of D(f(E(x))) (second step). Any difference between results of these
two steps indicates an error. The functions E and D are referred to as encoding
and decoding functions, respectively, and they can be usually chosen such that
D = E−1. It is worth mentioning that for conventional binary operands, E and D
are simple shifts of operand bits and this is why it is referred to as RESO.
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3.2 Concurrent Error Detection Strategy
Errors may be caused by different types of faults such as open faults, short (bridg-
ing) faults, and/or stuck-at faults. Furthermore, the faults can be transient or
permanent. We assume that locations of these faults, occurred naturally or in-
jected by an attacker, are random.
In this section, we use RESO method to concurrently detect errors in arithmetic
operations over the field GF (2m). For the polynomial, normal and dual bases, the
encoding and decoding functions are chosen in a way that the overhead costs (in
terms of area and time) are fairly low. Additionally, in this chapter, the arithmetic
operations addition/subtraction, multiplication, inversion, division, and exponenti-
ation are considered. Figure 3.1 shows a general architecture of an operation with
concurrent error detection. In the figure, two encoding functions of the inputs are
E1 and E2 and the decoding function of the output is D. Clearly, for inversion the
second input should not be considered. Also, for exponentiation the exponent is a
non-negative integer number and is not an extension field element. Therefore, this
input of exponentiation is not considered as well.
Let us assume that the arithmetic operation performs the f function. Then we
have:
C = f(A, B).
Also, let AE1 = E1(A) and BE2 = E2(B). Considering that C
′ is the result of the
second computation after decoding, we have:






0 if C = C ′,
1 if C 6= C ′.













Figure 3.1: General architecture for the arithmetic operations with CED
In the following, the above-mentioned concurrent error detection strategy for
each basis is investigated.
3.2.1 CED for Polynomial Basis (PB) Arithmetic Opera-
tions
Let us denote PB of GF (2m) as 1, x, · · · , xm−1. A possible candidate for encoding
and decoding functions in the PB representation of the elements of the field is
multiplication by x or x−1. Clearly, all arithmetic operations are modulo the field
defining polynomial F (x). Particularly, elements xm and x−1 modulo F (x) are as
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follows:




i mod F (x),




i mod F (x).
(3.1)











m mod F (x)
= (0, a0, · · · , am−3, am−2) + am−1(1, f1, · · · , fm−2, fm−1).
(3.2)










i−1 mod F (x)
= (a1, a2, · · · , am−1, 0) + a0(f1, f2, · · · , fm−1, 1).
(3.3)
Hereafter, the former and the latter are referred to as (forward) scaling and inverse
scaling, respectively. Additionally, both scalings are very inexpensive in hardware
implementations. An overhead analysis will be given in Section 3.3.1.
Note that multiplication of an element with xi or x−i can be considered as i
consecutive scalings or inverse scalings, respectively. In the following, encoding and
decoding functions are determined for each operation. Also, we show the procedure
of CED in each PB arithmetic operation, assuming that A, B, C ∈ GF (2m).
1. Addition/Subtraction: E1 = x, E2 = x, D = x
−1.
(a) Compute A + B = C; Store in a register;
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(b) Compute Ax + Bx = (A + B)x = Cx; Inverse scaling; Compare this
result with that of (a).
2. Multiplication: E1 = x, E2 = x, D = x
−2.
(a) Compute A× B = C; Store in a register;
(b) Compute Ax×Bx = (A×B)x2 = Cx2; Two inverse scalings; Compare
this result with that of (a).
3. Inversion: E1 = x, D = x.
(a) Compute 1
A





)x−1 = Cx−1; Forward scaling; Compare this result
with that of (a).
4. Division: E1 = x, E2 = x
−1, D = x−2.
(a) Compute A
B





x2 = Cx2; Two inverse scalings; Compare this result
with that of (a).
5. Exponentiation: E1 = x, D = x
−n, where n is a non-negative integer.
(a) Compute An = C; Store in a register;
(b) Compute (Ax)n = Anxn = Cxn; n inverse scaling; Compare this result
with that of (a).
For large n, to speed up the exponentiation, one can pre-compute and store x−n
for 1 ≤ n ≤ 2m − 1 in some fault-tolerant manner.
Alternative encodings and decodings for multiplication and division are as fol-
lows:
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• Multiplication: E1 = x, E2 = x−1, No decoding.
1. Compute A× B = C; Store in a register;
2. Compute Ax× Bx−1 = (A× B) = C; Compare this result with that of
(a).
• Division: E1 = x, E2 = x, No decoding.
1. Compute A
B





= C; Compare this result with that of (a).
Although this is more efficient for implementation, it may result in a lower error
detection capability. For example, a permanent single-bit fault at the end of an
arithmetic operation cannot be detected, since such faults change the results of
both runs in a same manner and generates identical results even in the presence of
the faults.
3.2.2 CED for Dual Basis (DB) Arithmetic Operations
Similar to PB arithmetic operations, a suitable candidate for encoding and decoding
functions in DB representation of the elements of the field is multiplication of an
element by x or x−1. This multiplication is considered in Lemma 3.1.
Lemma 3.1 Let A = (a′0, a
′
1, · · · , a
′
m−1) ∈ GF (2
m) be represented in dual basis.
Let F (x) =
∑m
i=0 fix
i be the field defining polynomial. Then the (forward) scaling
and inverse scaling can be performed as follows:
xA = (a′1, a
′
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Proof The proof for forward scaling can be found in [65]. Similarly, the inverse
scaling can be proved as follows. Assume that the PB representation of A is










Moreover, according to [65], we have:
Tr(xjA) = a′j .












































1, · · · , a
′
m−2).
Note that for low weight F (x), the hardware implementation of DB scalings
requires only a few gates (see Section 3.3.2). Moreover, functions E1, E2 (if ap-
plicable), and D can be chosen same as those chosen for PB representation in
Section 3.2.1 and similar CED procedure can be performed.
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2i be the NB representation of A. Then considering that the





























= (â1, · · · , âm−2, âm−1, â0).
(3.5)
The hardware implementations of NB squaring and taking the square root
have no cost (see Section 3.3.3). Therefore, in NB arithmetic operations, proper
choices for encoding and decoding functions are squaring and taking the square
root. Moreover, the procedures of CED in NB arithmetic operations are more uni-
form since the encoding function(s) and the decoding function are always squaring
and taking the square root, respectively. The CED procedures follow, assuming
that A, B, C ∈ GF (2m) and n is a non-negative integer.
1. Addition/Subtraction:
(a) Compute A + B = C; Store in a register;
(b) Compute A2 + B2 = (A + B)2 = C2; Take square root; Compare this
result with that of (a).
2. Multiplication:
(a) Compute A× B = C; Store in a register;
(b) Compute A2 × B2 = (A × B)2 = C2; Take square root; Compare this
result with that of (a).























= C2; Take square root; Compare this result with
that of (a).
5. Exponentiation:
(a) Compute An = C; Store in a register;
(b) Compute (A2)n = (An)2 = C2; Take square root; Compare this result
with that of (a).
3.3 Pipeline Architecture and Overhead Analysis
The proposed CED scheme is based on time redundancy. A straightforward imple-
mentation causes more than 100% time redundancy which may not be desirable. An
efficient architecture that can reduce the time overhead significantly is a pipeline
architecture. Additionally, this architecture has a moderate area overhead. An
example for the pipelined architecture is the systolic array, which is used for high
performance arithmetic operations. As shown in Figure 3.2(a), one buffer is added
to the end of the pipeline architecture to store the result of the (first) computa-
tion of the arithmetic operation. Then the result of the second computation after
decoding will be compared against the content of the last buffer of the pipeline.
Another possibility is to start performing the operation with encoded inputs first
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and then perform the normal computation. In this case, a decoder should be placed
after the added buffer as shown in Figure 3.2(b).
checker
equality






















Figure 3.2: General pipelined architecture of an arithmetic operation with the
proposed CED
Suppose that the number of pipeline stages is l. Let the propagation delays of the
encoding function, the decoding function, the ith stage of the pipeline (including
a buffer), the buffer, the equality checker, and one XOR gate be te, td, ti, tb,
tc, and tX , respectively. Let t
′
clk and tclk be the clock period of the pipelined
arithmetic operation with and without CED, respectively. Clearly, tclk ≥ Max{ti}
for 1 ≤ i ≤ l. Also, in practice, tclk ≥ tX . For each pipeline architecture of
Figure 3.2, t′clk, the clock period and latency overheads are given in Table 3.1. One
can choose one of the above-mentioned architectures which has a smaller latency
overhead.
It is worth mentioning that in some pipeline architectures such as systolic arrays,
the delay of the equality checker (tc) can be larger than other delays mentioned in
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(a) ≥ Max {te+t1, Max{ti}, tl−tb+td+tc} t′clk − tclk l ×∆t(a) + t
′
clk
(b) ≥ Max {te + t1, Max{ti}, tl − tb + tc, td + tc} t′clk − tclk l ×∆t(b) + t
′
clk
Table 3.1: The time overheads for the different pipelined architectures
the second column of Table 3.1 under t′clk. In this case, one may be able to reduce
tc using a suitable method such as pipelining the checker. This will be addressed
with more details in Section 3.4.4.
3.3.1 Overheads in PB Operations
The hardware implementations of the PB scaling or inverse scaling are very inex-
pensive since they need a cyclic shift to the right or left, which is free of cost in
hardware, and ω − 2 XOR gates, where ω is the Hamming weight of F (x). Fig-
ure 3.3 shows the implementations of both scalings. As shown in the figure, the
propagation delay for one PB scaling or inverse scaling is tX , since there is one level
























Figure 3.3: (a) Scaling and (b) inverse scaling in PB operations
As mentioned before, the multiplication of a finite field element with xi or x−i
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can be implemented by i scalings or inverse scalings, respectively. Therefore, the
maximum number of XOR gates required for the implementation is i(ω − 2).
To implement a PB arithmetic operation with CED, we need two encoding
functions at maximum. Each of them consists of one scaling or inverse scaling.
Additionally, we need one decoding function that consists of two scalings or inverse
scalings at maximum, except for exponentiation. Therefore, 4(ω − 2) XOR gates
are needed for encoding and decoding functions for a PB arithmetic operation other
than exponentiation. We also have:
te ≈ tX ,
td ≤ 2tX .
3.3.2 Overheads in DB Operations
The hardware implementations of the DB scalings need a cyclic shift to right or left
and ω − 2 XOR gates, where ω is the Hamming weight of F (x) (see Figure 3.4).
As shown in the figure, the propagation delay for one DB scaling or inverse scaling
is (ω− 2)tX due to the propagation delay of the least significant bit of a scaling or
the most significant bit of an inverse scaling.
Similar to PB arithmetic operations, for a DB arithmetic operation other than
exponentiation, 4(ω−2) XOR gates are needed for encoding and decoding functions
at maximum. We also have:
te ≈ (ω − 2)tX ,
td ≤ 2(ω − 2)tX .
3.3.3 Overheads in NB Operations
Squaring and taking the square root of an element represented in NB needs just a
cyclic shift to right or left (see Figure 3.5).











































Figure 3.5: (a) Squaring and (b) taking the square root in NB operations
Therefore, squaring and taking the square root have no area and time overhead
in a hardware implementation and we have:
te = td = 0.
The area overheads for pipeline implementations of PB, DB and NB GF (2m)
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arithmetic operations with the proposed CED are summarized in Table 3.2. It is
worth mentioning that the added buffer is m bits long. Also, m XOR gates and
one m-input OR gate are needed in the equality checker unit. Note that for all
practical values of m, either a trinomial (ω = 3) or a pentanomial (ω = 5) can be
found as the field defining polynomial [59].
PB1 DB1 NB
m-bit Buffer 1 1 1
Maximum area overhead 2-input XOR (m + 4ω − 8) (m + 4ω − 8) m
m-input OR 1 1 1
Table 3.2: The area overheads of PB, DB and NB arithmetic operations with the
proposed CED
1The exponentiation operation is not considered.
3.4 A Closer Look at Polynomial, Dual and Nor-
mal Bases Multipliers with CED
In this section, two semi-systolic multipliers for PB and DB bases and two such
multipliers for NB basis are presented. Then the time and area complexities of each
of them with or without CED are given.
3.4.1 A Systolic PB Multiplier with CED
Let A, B, C ∈ GF (2m). Then the result of their PB multiplication is as follows:
C = A.B mod F (x)
= b0A + b1xA + · · ·+ bm−1x
m−1A mod F (x).
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Let A(0) = A and A(i) = xA(i−1) mod F (x). Then we have:
C = b0A
(0) + b1A
(1) + · · ·+ bm−1A
(m−1) mod F (x).
Considering that C =
∑m−1
j=0 Cjx















where 0 ≤ i ≤ m− 1 and c(−1)j = 0. Also according to (3.2) for 1 ≤ i ≤ m− 1, we
have:






m−2 ) + a
(i−1)
















































; 1 ≤ i ≤ m− 1.
(3.9)
where 0 ≤ j ≤ m− 1 and a(i)−1 = 0.
Figure 3.6 shows a general view of an arbitrary cell of a semi-systolic PB mul-
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tiplier based on expression (3.9). The reason that we call it semi-systolic is that
each cell may receive a number of input signals from non-adjacent cells or output





Figure 3.6: General cell architecture for a semi-systolic PB mutliplier
It is worth mentioning that except for f0 and fm, the number of non-zero fi’s
for 1 ≤ i ≤ m − 1 is ω − 2, where ω is the Hamming weight of F (x). Therefore,
we can have two different cells, one for those that have fi = 0 (type 1) and another







Figure 3.7: (a) Type 1 cell and (b) type 2 cell of a semi-systolic PB multiplier
Let us refer to type 1 and type 2 cells as PBT1 and PBT2. Figure 3.8 shows
the semi-systolic PB multiplier.





PBT2 PBT2 PBT2 PBT1
PBT1 PBT2 PBT2 PBT2 PBT1
PBT1 PBT2 PBT2 PBT2 PBT1
PBT1
ai aj ak0 0 0 0 0am−1
c0 ci cj ck cm−1
Figure 3.8: A semi-systolic PB mutliplier
In the figure, it is assumed that fi, fj and fk are not zero. Consequently,
the cells of the columns i, j and k are type 2 (PBT2). Generally, we have (m −
w + 2) PBT1 and (ω − 2) PBT2 in each row. Furthermore, PBT1 and PBT2
contain (1 AND, 1 XOR, 2 Latches) and (1 AND, 2 XORs, 2 Latches), respectively.
Table 3.3(a) presents the total number of required gates or latches for a semi-systolic
PB multiplier. It is worth mentioning that for all practical values of m, one can
find irreducible low-weight polynomials, either a trinomial or a pentanomial, where
a trinomial does not exist [59]. Also, the computation time for each type of cells is








cell computation time per cell
PBT1 TA + TX + TL
PBT2 TA + 2TX + TL
Table 3.3: Space and time complexities of the semi-systolic PB multiplier
For the purpose of error detection, we applied the method discussed in Sec-
tion 3.2.1. In other words, each encoding function is one forward scaling and
the decoding function is two inverse scalings. Table 3.4 shows the area and time
complexities of this work along with a number of previously published systolic or
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semi-systolic PB multipliers without CED capability and with CED capability if
applicable.
In [41] and [19], two checkers (comparators) are used. One is to detect errors at
the output of the circuit and another is to detect errors on global lines. These lines
are horizontal lines that connect a bit of one of the inputs (say input B) to all cells
in a row of the multiplier. However, in our proposed scheme since both inputs are
encoded, errors in the global lines can also be detected.
According to Table 3.4, the space complexities and latencies of the multipliers
with or without CED presented in this work seem to be better as compared to the
other multipliers mentioned in the table. Note that ω = 3 or ω = 5 and the latency
of the multiplier without CED in [41] is the same as our work but that multiplier
is not general. Apparently, the cell time complexity of our work is not among the
best. However, this may not be considered as a drawback in multipliers with CED
because the bottleneck for determining the minimum clock period is usually the
propagation delay of equality checkers, not the cell time complexity. This will be
further investigated in Section 3.4.4.
3.4.2 A Systolic DB Multiplier with CED
Suppose that A, B, C ∈ GF (2m) and C = A.B mod F (x). The formulation for
DB multiplication is similar to the PB one except for the following. Let A(0) = A.



























































Table 3.4: Space and time complexities of a number of systolic or semi-systolic PB multipliers
Multipliers [41] [19] [64] [70] [39] This work
Generating
polynomial
AOP General General General Trinomial General
CED No Yes No Yes No No No No Yes




XOR2 2m2 2m2 + 7m — 2m — 2m2 m2 + m m(m + ω − 2) m2 +(ω−1)m+
4(ω − 2)
XOR3 — — m2 + m m2 + 2m m2 — — — —
AND2 2m2 2m2 + 4m 2m2 + 2m 2m2 + 4m 2m2 2m2 m2 m2 m2
AND3 — m — — — — — — —
Latch1 2m2 2m2 + 6m 3.5m2 + 3.5m 3.5m2 +
7.5m + 1
7m2 7m2 3.5m2 +
m((2))
2m2 2m2 + m
ORm — 2 — 2 — — — — 1
2-1 Switch — — — — — — m — —
Min. CLK
period
2TA + 2TX +
TL
((3)) TA +T3X +
TL
((3)) TA + TX +
2TL
TA + TX +
2TL




Latency m m + 2 m + 1 m + 5 3m 3m m + k m m + 1
((1))The space complexity of this work has to be more than the complexity mentioned in the table, because the corresponding encoding
and decoding functions were not considered.
((2))Each cell needs 3 or 4 latches. Hence, we estimate that 3.5m2 latches are needed for all cells as well as m extra latches at the
end of computation.
((3))Should be similarly computed according to Table 3.1 and Max{ti} is same as that of the multiplier without CED.








a′j; i = 0, 0 ≤ j ≤ m− 1,
a
′(i−1)




k ; j = m− 1, 1 ≤ i ≤ m− 1.
(3.10)





















k ; j = m− 1, 1 ≤ i ≤ m− 1.
(3.11)
Considering Expression (3.11), we can consider two types of cells for semi-
systolic DB multipliers as shown in Figure 3.9. Except for the last column of
the multiplier (j 6= m − 1), type 1 cells are used (see Figure 3.9(a)). These cells








Figure 3.9: (a) Type 1 cell and (b) type 2 cell of a semi-systolic DB multiplier
Type 2 cells (Figure 3.9(b)) are used in the last column. In addition to the
gates and latches needed for type 1 cells, type2 cells require one extra 2-input or
4-input XOR gate depending on whether the defining polynomial of the underlying
field is a trinomial (ω = 3) or pentanomial (ω = 5), respectively. Figure 3.10 shows
a semi-systolic DB multiplier.
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Figure 3.10: A semi-systolic DB multiplier
The error detection scheme presented in Section 3.2.2 is applied to this multi-
plier. Hence, the encoding and decoding functions are one forward scaling and two
inverse scalings, respectively. Table 3.5 summarizes the time and space complexi-
ties of this work and a number of previously published multipliers with and without
CED capability as appropriate.
According to Table 3.5 the multipliers (with and without CED) presented in this
work can be considered as the best ones in terms of space complexity and latency.
It is worth mentioning that latches are relatively more area consuming components
and hence the multiplier in [39] requires more space than our work. The cell time
complexity of our work is not lower than the other multipliers, however, this does
not imply that the minimum clock period (MCP) of our work with CED is larger
than another multiplier with CED. This case mostly happens when the other delay
parameters for determining MCP (according to Table 3.1), such as propagation
delay of the equality checker, is larger than the cell time complexity.
3.4.3 A Systolic NB Multiplier with CED





































Table 3.5: Space and time complexities of a number of systolic or semi-systolic DB multipliers
Multipliers [25] [40] [39] This work
CED No No Yes No No Yes
Cell no. m2 m2 m2 + m m2 m2 m2
Space complexity ω = 3 ω = 5 ω = 3 ω = 5
XOR2 2m2 2m2 3m2 + 3m − 2 m2 + m m2 + m m2 − m m2 + 2m + 4 m2 + 12
XOR4 — — — — — m — m
AND2 2m2 2m2 3m2 − m m2 m2 m2
Latch1 7m2 5m2 10m2 − 2m − 4 3.5m2 + m 2m2 2m2 + m
ORm — — 1 — — 1
2-1 Switch — — — m — —
Min. CLK period TA + TX + TL TA + TX + TL
((1)) TA + TX + TL TA + 2TX + TL TA + TX +
T4X + TL
((2))
Latency 3m 3m 3m + 1 m + k m m + 1
((1))Should be computed according to Table 3.1, where Max{ti} = TA + 2TX + TL.
((2))Should be similarly computed according to Table 3.1 and Max{ti} is same as that of the multiplier without CED.
3.4 A Closer Look at PB, DB and NB Multipliers with CED 50
Type I Optimal Normal Basis (ONB1)
Suppose that m + 1 is a prime number and 2 is primitive in GF (m + 1). Then the
field defining polynomial, can be chosen to be F (x) =
∑m
i=0 x
i, which is an all-ones
irreducible polynomial over GF (2m). Let x be the root of F (x). Since F (x)|(xm+1−
1), we have xm+1 ≡ 1. Therefore, the set of normal basis presented in Section 2.1,
can be reduced accordingly. The resulting set has m linearly independent elements
[45] as follows and is referred to as type I optimal normal basis:
{
x, x2, · · · , xm−1, xm
}
.
It is worth mentioning that the order of the elements in the above set is different
from the conventional representation of a normal basis. Therefore, we define the
following permutation functions that basically change the order of the coefficients
in the normal basis representations:
Γ1 : NB =⇒ ONB1,
Γ−11 : ONB1 =⇒ NB.
Suppose that the NB and ONB1 representations of A ∈ GF (2m) are A = â0x +
â1x
2 + â2x
22 + ...+ âm−1x
2m−1 and A = a1x+ a2x
2 + a3x
3 + ...+ amx
m, respectively.
Also, let us assume that after permutation we have aj = âi, Then:
j = 2i mod (m + 1).
Now, suppose that A, B, C ∈ GF (2m) are represented in ONB1. Hence, A =
∑m
i=0 âix
i and B =
∑m
i=0 b̂ix
i, where â0 = b̂0 = 0. Therefore, using the previous
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notations we have:
C = A.B mod (xm+1 − 1)
= b̂0A
(0) + b̂1A
(1) + · · ·+ b̂m−1A
(m−1) + b̂mA
(m) mod (xm+1 − 1).
(3.12)
Expression (3.12) is very similar to PB multiplication except that this multipli-
























where < j − 1 >= j − 1 mod m + 1. In fact, A(i) is one bit rotation of A(i−1) in
such a way that the MSB of A(i−1) shifts out and rotates back to the LSB position.
Clearly, A(0) = A.






















<j−1>; 1 ≤ i ≤ m− 1.
(3.14)
where 0 ≤ j ≤ m− 1 and < j − 1 >= j − 1 mod m + 1.
Note that C(m) is not necessarily in ONB1 representation, since C
(m)
0 may not
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be zero. To resolve this issue, one can zero out C
(m)
0 as follows:
C = C(m) + C
(m)
0 .F (x).
Figure 3.11 shows a cell of a semi-systolic ONB1 multiplier.
bi
ai
Figure 3.11: The cell of a semi-systolic ONB1 multiplier
It is worth mentioning that since F (x) is an all-ones polynomial, one can simply
add the LSB of C(m) with all other bits of C(m) in the hardware implementation.








Figure 3.12: A semi-systolic ONB1 multiplier
Furthermore, as shown in Figure 3.12, b0 = 0 is one input of all AND gates
of the cells in the first row. Therefore, the first row can be omitted and then ai’s
should be fed into the first row after one rotation (see Figure 3.13). Clearly, in this
way the space and latency of the multiplier are slightly reduced.








Figure 3.13: A semi-systolic ONB1 multiplier with m rows
The error detection scheme presented in Section 3.2.3 is applied to this multi-
plier. The encoding and decoding functions are one or two shifts to the left or right.
Apparently, the encodings should be performed before the permutation Γ1 and the
decoding should be performed after the inverse permutation Γ−11 . The time and
space complexities of this work with and without CED capability are presented in
Table 3.6.
According to Table 3.6, the ONB1 multiplier presented here is better than that
in [39] in terms of space complexity and latency and they are the same in terms
of cell time complexity. Furthermore, to the best of our knowledge this is the first
work that addressed the CED in NB multipliers.
Type II Optimal Normal Basis (ONB2)
Suppose that 2m+1 is a prime number and either of the following conditions holds:
• 2 is primitive in GF (2m + 1), or
• 2m + 1 = 3 (mod 4) and the multiplicative order of 2 modulo 2m + 1 is m.
Then the field GF (2m) can be constructed using the normal element γ + γ−1 [45]
and the basis for field representation is referred to as type II optimal normal basis
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as follows:
{






where γ is a primitive (2m + 1)th root of unity. Hence, for 1 ≤ i ≤ 2m− 1, γi = 1
only when i = 2m + 1. It is worth mentioning that the above set can be rewritten
as follows [62]:
{
γ + γ−1, γ2 + γ−2, γ3 + γ−3, · · · , γm + γ−m
}
.
Similar to ONB1, a permutation function is needed to convert an NB representation
to an ONB2 representation and vise versa. Hence,
Γ2 : NB =⇒ ONB2,
Γ−12 : ONB2 =⇒ NB.
Suppose that the NB and ONB2 representations of A ∈ GF (2m) are A = â0x +
â1x
2 + â2x
22 + ... + âm−1x
2m−1 and A = a1(γ + γ
−1) + a2(γ
2 + γ−2) + a3(γ
3 + γ−3) +
· · · + am(γm + γ−m), respectively. Also, let us assume that after permutation we





k; 1 ≤ k ≤ m,
(2m + 1)− k; m + 1 ≤ k ≤ 2m.
where k = 2i mod (2m + 1).
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Now, suppose that A, B, C ∈ GF (2m) are represented in ONB2, e.g., A =
∑m
i=1 âi(γ
i + γ−i). Then following [62], we have:








































































= C21 + C22.
Now, we adjust the power of the basis for C11, C12, C21 and C22 by changing
the variables as follows:




















Note that for i = 1, the upper bound of the second summation becomes
negative and the result is all zero.
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To derive a single closed form for the multiplication, we have:











where |i− k| is the absolute value of (i− k) and b̂0 = 0. Also, we have:
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i + k; i + k ≤ m,
(2m + 1)− (i + k); i + k > m.
Finally, we have:





















To have a recursive (rolled) form which is suitable for systolic arrays, we can











k + âib̂|i−k| + âib̂||i+k||,
(3.16)
where 1 ≤ i, k ≤ m, C(−1)k = 0, ĉk = C
(m)
k and b̂0 = 0.
Figure 3.14 shows two possible implementations for a cell of the ONB2 semi-
systolic multiplier according to Expression 3.16. One can choose one of the above-







Figure 3.14: Two cells of a semi-systolic ONB2 multiplier with same functionality
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In this work, we have chosen the cell shown in Figure 3.14(b). A complete











b0 = 0 b1
000 0
Figure 3.15: A semi-systolic ONB2 multiplier
Similar to the ONB1 multiplier, the error detection scheme presented in Sec-
tion 3.2.3 is applied to this multiplier. The encoding and decoding functions are
one or two shifts to the left or right. It is worth mentioning that the encodings and
the decoding should be performed before the permutation function Γ2 and after the
inverse permutation function Γ−12 , respectively. The time and space complexities
of this work for ONB1 and ONB2 along with a number of other related previous
work with and/or without CED capability are presented in Table 3.6.
According to Table 3.6, the ONB2 multiplier presented here can be considered
among the best in terms of space complexity and is the best in terms of latency.
Additionally as mentioned earlier, to the best of our knowledge this is the first work
addressing the CED in NB multipliers.
3.4.4 Some Notes About Delays of Cells and Equality Check-
ers
The clock rate of a pipeline architecture can be determined according to a number
of parameters presented in Table 3.1 (second column). The propagation delays of




































Table 3.6: Space and time complexities of a number of systolic or semi-systolic ONB multipliers
Multipliers [39] [38] This work
ONB Type I II II I II
CED No No No No Yes No Yes
Cell no. (m + 1)2 m2 m2 m(m + 1) m(m + 1) m2
Space complexity
XOR2 (m + 1)2 + m m2 + m m m(m + 1) m2 + 2m — m
XOR3 — — m2 — — m2 m2
AND2 (m + 1)2 m2 2m2 + m m(m + 1) m(m + 1) 2m2 2m2
Latch1 3.5(m + 1)2 3.5m2 + m 5m2 2m(m + 1) 2m2 + 3m 3m2 3m2 + m
ORm — — — — 1 — 1
Min. CLK period TA + TX + TL TA + TX + TL TA + T3X + TL TA + TX + TL
((1)) TA + T3X + TL
((1))
Latency m + 1 m + 1 m + 1 m m + 1 m m + 1
((1))Should be computed according to Table 3.1 and Max{ti} is same as that multiplier without CED.
3.4 A Closer Look at PB, DB and NB Multipliers with CED 60
small. Particularly for these architectures, one important parameter to determine
the clock rate is the delay of the equality checker. In the following this issue is
investigated.
The equality checker is basically one level of XOR gates to check the equality of














Figure 3.16: An m-bit equality checker
A straightforward method to design the OR unit is to use 2-input OR gates.
Then m such gates in ⌈log2m⌉ levels are needed. Therefore, tc = tX + ⌈log2m⌉tOR2 .
Alternatively, one can construct the m-input OR unit using ⌈lognm⌉ levels of n-
input OR gates. To determine the efficient one, we performed a number of simula-
tions in CadenceTM at switch-level (transistor-level). For m = 163, we constructed
163-input OR unit in the following ways:
• 1-level 163-input OR
• 2-level 13-input OR
• 3-level 6-input OR
• 4-level 4-input OR
• 8-level 2-input OR
For the purpose of simulation, gates were modeled using ratioed logic that uses
only one PMOS transistor in the pull-up network. We used 0.18µm technology.
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Also, we initialized all inputs of the gates with zero and after a while we changed
the value of only one of them to one. The result of the transient response simulation
is shown in Figure 3.17.
Figure 3.17: The propagation delays for different ways of implementing an m-input
OR unit
According to the figure, the best propagation delay is for 2-level 13-input OR
design. Furthermore, both 8-level 2-input OR and 1-level 163-input OR designs
are significantly slower. The reason that the 1-level 163-input OR design is slow
is that all 163 NMOS transistors of the pull-down network are connected to each
other in parallel. This produces a large parasitic capacitance at the output of the
gate, which is time-consuming to be discharged when one NMOS transistor turns
on.
It is worth mentioning that if one needs to use the standard cells of a library,
the best choice is 4-level 4-input OR design because the 13-input OR gate are often
unavailable in the standard cells and it has the smallest propagation delay after
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2-level 13-input design.
Moreover, if after designing the equality checker, tc becomes larger than the
other parameters for determining the clock rate of the pipeline, and decreasing
the clock rate is not desirable, one can implement the equality checker in a pipeline
manner. In other words, the equality checker can be divided into two or more stages
such that the propagation delays of its stages become smaller than the desired clock
period. Clearly, this approach results in a larger latency in terms of the required
clock cycles.
3.5 Error Detection Capability
In this section the capabilities of the error detection schemes discussed earlier are
evaluated. With regard to the duration of faults, we consider two categories of
faults in our simulations as follows:
• Transient faults: These faults are assumed to occur only in one of the two
runs.
• Permanent (or intermittent) faults: These faults occur in both runs.
The percentage of error detection for the transient faults is 100%, because either
these faults make the output erroneous or they are masked. In the first case, the
result of the first run and the second run are different. Hence, the fault causing
errors is detected.
For permanent (or intermittent) faults, we performed a number of simulation-
based fault injections on the PB, DB, ONB1 and ONB2 multipliers presented in
Section 3.4. Fault injections were performed in a C model of the multiplier. We
injected stuck-at faults (both stuck-at 1 and stuck-at 0) at the input and output
pins of the gates of the multiplier. In the proposed scheme, same faults are injected
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in the same locations of the circuits in both runs. Fault injection in a complete
multiplier with a field degree of approximately 163 is extremely time consuming.
Therefore, faults were injected in only one randomly chosen row of cells of the semi-
systolic multipliers. We performed the fault injections in two phases as discussed
below.
Single-Bit Stuck-at Faults
In this experiment, only one-bit stuck-at fault was injected during the multipli-
cation. As mentioned earlier, the location of a fault can be at the input and/or
output pins of gates. Hence, to perform fault injection, a multiplexer can be placed
at the fault location, where the control signal of the multiplexer selects between the
original value of that point and the fault. Moreover, the fault value can be chosen




fault injection select (FIS)




faulty; if FIS=1 and FV 6= OPV,
not faulty; otherwise.
Figure 3.18: Conventional fault injection at a gate pin
The number of faults that can be injected to a multiplier for each set of inputs
depends on the number of AND gates and XOR gates of that multiplier (see Ta-
ble 3.4, Table 3.5 and Table 3.6). It is worth mentioning that the output pins of
AND gates in each cell, which are direct inputs of the XOR gates, were not injected.
In this experiment, we simulated the fault injection for PB, DB, ONB1 and ONB2
multipliers. Each multiplier was simulated for one million random input pairs and
for every pair, all the above mentioned single-bit stuck-at faults were injected. Ta-
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ble 3.7 shows the number of injected single-bit stuck-at faults for each set of inputs
as well as the percentage of error detection for each multiplier. Note that the
field GF (2163) cannot be represented using ONB1 or ONB2. Therefore, we chose
other fields of close degrees instead. The number of detected, masked and unde-
tected faults are 1074930775, 575069225 and 0 for the PB multiplier, 1078354457,
563645543 and 0 for the DB multiplier, 994414981, 634206218 and 3378801 for










GF (2163) PB 1650 1000000 100%
GF (2163) DB 1642 1000000 100%
GF (2162) ONB1 1632 1000000 99.66%
GF (2173) ONB2 2770 1000000 100%
Table 3.7: Percentage of error detection of the RESO based scheme for finite field
multipliers against single stuck-at faults
In the following, we give an example for a single stuck-at fault injection at a
GF (24) ONB1 multiplier. Let A = 6 and B = 3 be the inputs of the multiplier. The
fault free result of the multiplication is 2 or 01001. We inject a stuck-at one fault
at the right hand side input of the XOR gate (see Figure 3.11) in the first cell of
the second row of the multiplier. In the first computation according to Figure 3.12,
we have:
1. Converting from NB to ONB1: AONB1 = 00101 and BONB1 = 01100
2. Computation in presence of the fault:
1Binary representations in this example are least significant bit (LSB) first.
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row bi=row−1 vertical output of the cells diagonal output of the cells
1 0 00000 00101
2 1 00010 10010
3 1 01011 01001
4 0 01011 10100
5 0 01011 01010
3. Converting the result of multiplication, i.e., 01011, from ONB1 to NB: 1011
In the second computation, we have:
1. Encoding (squaring): enA = 0011 and enB = 0110
2. Converting from NB to ONB1: enAONB1 = 00011 and enBONB1 = 00101
3. Computation in presence of the fault:
row bi=row−1 vertical output of the cells diagonal output of the cells
1 0 00000 00011
2 0 10000 10001
3 1 01000 11000
4 0 01000 01100
5 1 01110 00110
4. Converting the result of multiplication, i.e., 01110, from ONB1 to NB: 1101
5. Decoding (taking the square root): 1011
The final results of the first and the second computations are same and both
are incorrect. Therefore, the fault cannot be detected. It is worth mentioning that
as presented in Table 3.7 we could not find any undetected error for the PB, DB
and ONB2 multipliers based on our simulations.
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Multiple-Bit Stuck-at Faults
To inject multiple-bit stuck-at faults, the locations for the injections were randomly
selected from the above mentioned single-bit fault locations. Then one stuck-at 0
or stuck-at 1 was randomly injected there. We injected 500 multiple-bit stuck-at
faults for each set of inputs. Furthermore, one million random sets of inputs were
simulated in each experiment. For example for a GF (2163) PB multiplier, there
are 825 single-bit stuck-at fault locations. All simulations for PB, DB, ONB1 and
ONB2 multipliers result in the detection of all errors.
For more information about our procedures of the fault injections, see Ap-
pendix A.
3.6 Concurrent Error Correction
The RESO method can also be used for correcting errors resulting from transient
faults. As stated earlier, we assume that locations of these faults, occurred naturally
or injected by an attacker, are random. This scheme, however, is not suitable to
correct errors due to permanent faults.
Figure 3.19 shows a general architecture for correcting errors confined in one of
the three runs. This architecture uses a well known majority voter and it can be
easily extended to correct M ≤ ⌊N−1
2
⌋ errors using N runs (see [37]).
Bellow we give the encoding and decoding functions for CEC corresponding to
Figure 3.19 of each basis:
• Encoding and decoding functions for PB and DB
1. Addition/Subtraction:
E1,1 = x, E1,2 = x, D1 = x
−1
E2,1 = x
−1, E2,2 = x
−1, D2 = x

















Figure 3.19: General architecture for the arithmetic operations with CEC (using a
2-of-3 system)
2. Multiplication:
E1,1 = x, E1,2 = x, D1 = x
−2
E2,1 = x
−1, E2,2 = x
−1, D2 = x
2
3. Inversion:
E1,1 = x, D1 = x
E2,1 = x
−1, D1 = x
−1
4. Division:
E1,1 = x, E1,2 = x
−1, D1 = x
−2
E2,1 = x
−1, E2,2 = x, D2 = x
2
5. Exponentiation:




−1, D2 = x
n
• Encoding and decoding functions for NB
1. Addition/Subtraction/Multiplication/Division:
E1,1 = E1,2 = squaring, D1 = taking the square root,
E2,1 = E2,2 = taking the square root, D2 = squaring.
2. Inversion/Exponentiation:
E1,1 = squaring, D1 = taking the square root,
E2,1 = taking the square root, D2 = squaring.
3.7 Summary
This chapter has presented a number of schemes, which are efficient for pipelined
architectures and are based on recomputing with shifted operands (RESO) method.
These schemes have been developed to concurrently detect errors in polynomial,
dual, type I and type II optimal normal bases arithmetic operations. We have
also presented one semi-systolic multiplier for each of above-mentioned bases and
applied the CED scheme to them. We have compared these multipliers with a
number of previously published systolic and/or semi-systolic ones. The results
show that this scheme can be considered among the best. Also, a simulation-
based fault injection has been performed for each of the multipliers. Results of
the simulations for single stuck-at faults show 100%, 100%, 99.66% and 100% error
detection for polynomial, dual, type I and type II bases multipliers, respectively.
The simulations also show that the percentage of error detection of this scheme for
the above-mentioned multipliers against multiple stuck-at faults is 100%. Finally,
we also commented on how RESO can be used for concurrent error correction to
deal with transient faults.
Chapter 4
Single Input Multiple Parity
(SIMP) Error Detection Scheme
for Polynomial Basis Multipliers
This chapter focuses on the detection of errors in polynomial basis multipliers.
In [24], Fenn et al. presented a concurrent error detection scheme for finite field
multipliers over binary extension fields. They used a parity bit for detecting errors
in bit-serial multipliers, using a number of bases for representation of fields, defined
by an irreducible all-ones polynomial. Thus, the scheme is not generic in the sense
that it cannot be used for other field defining polynomials. In [18], Chiou presented
a concurrent error detection for two bit-parallel systolic multipliers for extension
fields in which the field defining polynomials are irreducible all-ones polynomials or
irreducible equally spaced ones. In [55,57], Reyhani-Masoleh and Hasan developed
a generic parity based error detection scheme for both bit-serial and bit-parallel
polynomial basis multipliers. The scheme can detect any odd number of erroneous
bits. In this scheme, input parity is propagated through the multiplier, and pre-
dicted output parity is compared to actual output parity. In case of inequality of
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the parities, an error signal is given.
This work extends the work of [55,57] by applying multiple parity bits to poly-
nomial basis multipliers. Like [57], this work can be applied to any finite field
GF(2m). However, unlike [57], our work can detect all odd parity errors as well
as most of the even parity errors. Additionally, our work can detect at least m
multiple-bit errors in the multiplier.
The main contributions of this chapter are summarized as follows:
• A multiple parity scheme that can detect multiple-bit errors in both bit-serial
and bit-parallel polynomial basis multipliers over binary extension fields are
presented. The error detection capability of the scheme in the presence of
multiple-bit random errors is also investigated. With our proposed frequency
of check points, a maximum of one multiple-bit error in each round of the
bit-serial operation (or each slice of the bit-parallel operation) can be de-
tected. This implies that in a GF (2m) polynomial basis multiplier, at least
m multiple-bit errors can be detected.
• A number of experimental analyses are presented, including the simulation-
based fault-injection evaluation of the scheme and the analyses of the area and
time overheads. Our experimental results show that the area overhead tends
to increase linearly as the number of parity bits increases but the probability
of undetected errors decreases quite quickly. Furthermore, the area overhead
for the bit-serial implementation is quite low, e.g., for 8 parity bits the area
overhead is 10.29% and the error detection probability is 0.996. The area
overhead for a bit-parallel implementation of the multiplier is greater than the
corresponding bit-serial one, but it is still lower than the conventional dual
modular redundant systems. The average time overhead due to the use of the
scheme in bit-parallel implementations is 25%. For bit-serial implementations,
time overheads have been observed to be small to negligible.
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The organization of the remainder of this chapter is as follows. A concurrent er-
ror detection strategy is presented in Section 4.1. In Section 4.2, the error detection
capability of the scheme is investigated. Our experimental results for this scheme
are reported in Section 4.3. An alternative partitioning is presented in Section 4.4.
Finally, Section 4.5 gives a summary of the chapter.
This work appeared in [4, 7].
4.1 Concurrent Error Detection Strategy
In this section, an error detection scheme for PB multipliers is presented. Errors
may be caused by different types of faults such as open faults, short (bridging)
faults, and/or stuck-at faults. Furthermore, the faults can be transient or per-
manent. The goal of this scheme is to detect as many random errors as possible
including single and multiple errors. Towards this goal, we use a parity based
method. One-bit parity is able to detect the presence of any odd number of erro-
neous bits [42]. Here, we use additional parity bits in order to increase the error
detection capability. In particular, an m-bit input is divided into k parts and for
each part one parity bit is used. Thus, the m-bit PB representation of A ∈ GF (2m)
is divided as follows:
A = (A0, A1, A2, · · · , Ak−1).











For the sake of simplicity, we assume that k|m and the length of each part is









i = (ajk, ajk+1, ajk+2, · · · , ajk+l−1).
The parity of Aj is denoted as P (Aj). Using parity bits of Aj’s, a k-bit parity
of A is formed as follows:
P (A) = (P (A0), P (A1), P (A2), · · · , P (Ak−1)).
Then using the parity P (A), we construct the encoded A as follows:
E(A) = (A0, A1, A2, · · · , Ak−1, P (A)).
Unlike A which is represented with m bits, the field defining irreducible poly-
nomial F (x) requires m + 1 bits. In order to have the same length for partitioning,
we exclude the leading coefficient of F (x) and divide F (x) − xm into k parts as
follows:
F (x)− xm = (F0, F1, · · · , Fk−1).
The parity bit of Fj, 0 ≤ j ≤ k − 1, is denoted as P (Fj).
One of the important issues in detecting errors in the output of a finite field
multiplier (or an arbitrary circuit, in general) is parity prediction. The latter refers
to the task of determining the parity of the expected outputs by using the corre-
sponding inputs as well as the functionality of the circuit. As mentioned in Section
2.2.1, a polynomial basis multiplier consists of three modules: 1) SR module 2) SM
module, and 3) VA module. In the following, the parity prediction method for each
of these modules will be discussed.
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4.1.1 Multiple Parity Prediction in SR Module
In the following, the output parity of an SR module is predicted.










































A′ must be reduced by F (x) = xm +
∑k−1
j=0 Fj(x) as follows:
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Now, we group the expression and obtain





















































where a−1 = 0. Figure 4.1 shows a circuit diagram implementing A
′
j . In practice,
many coefficients of F (x) are zero and hence the corresponding XOR gates in
Figure 4.1 are not needed. By cascading k copies of the circuit shown in Figure 4.1,
an SR module can be constructed as illustrated in Figure 4.2.
Let ω be the Hamming weight of F (x). The total number of two-input XOR
gates required in an SR module is ω − 2, since no XOR gate is needed for the first
and the last coefficients of F (x).
For parity prediction of the jth part of the SR module, we have the following
lemma where A′ = xA and PFj =
∑l−1
i=0 fjl+i.
Lemma 4.1 Let P (Aj) and P (A
′
j) be the parities of the input and the expected















Figure 4.1: The jth part of the SR module
output of the jth part of the SR module, respectively. Then,
P (A′j) = ajl−1 + P (Aj) + a(j+1)l−1 + am−1PFj .
Proof Using (4.1) the proof is immediate.
Figure 4.3 shows the parity prediction circuit of the jth part of the SR module,
where P (x) is predicted parity of x. The parity of the jth part of F (x) is PFj and
is assumed to be known, since it can be pre-computed. Thus, the corresponding
AND gate is not really required. On the other hand, F (x) can be a trinomial
or a pentanomial and usually it can be chosen so that the parities of all parts
become zero, i.e., PFj = 0 for 0 ≤ j ≤ k − 1. In this case, the value of ak−1,l−1
is not important and one XOR gate is removed. In the worst case the circuit of
Figure 4.3 can be implemented with 3 two-input XOR gates. The total number of
two-input XOR gates for the whole parity prediction circuit is 3k.



















Part k − 1







Figure 4.3: Parity prediction circuit of the jth part of the SR module
Hereafter, an SR module together with its parity prediction circuit (PPC) is
referred to as SR-P module. It should be mentioned that different partitioning of
A and F can change the parity prediction circuit of the SR module. Section 4.4
presents a partitioning of A and F that reduces the number of XOR gates of each
parity prediction circuit by two, i.e., parity prediction circuit can be constructed
by only one XOR gate.
4.1 Concurrent Error Detection Strategy 77
4.1.2 Parity Prediction in Scalar Multiplication and Vector
Addition Modules
In this work, scalar multiplication refers to multiplication of an element of GF (2)
by an element of GF (2m) and vector addition refers to addition of two elements of
GF (2m). For bi ∈ GF (2) and A ∈ GF (2
m) = (a0, a1, · · · , am−1), scalar multiplica-
tion of bi and A is bi.A = (bia0, bia1, · · · , biam−1). Thus,
P (bi.A) = bia0 + bia1 + · · ·+ biam−1
= bi(a0 + a1 + · · ·+ am−1) = biP (A).
(4.2)
For A, B ∈ GF (2m), vector addition of A and B is:














P (A + B) =
m−1∑
i=0







= P (A) + P (B).
(4.3)
The circuit of the parity prediction, as defined in (4.2) and (4.3), are shown in
Figure 4.4 where they need k two-input AND gates and k two-input XOR gates,
respectively. These circuits for parity bits are now included with the SM and the
VA modules appropriately and the resulting new modules are hereafter referred to
as SM-P and VA-P.
















P (A + B)
(b)
Figure 4.4: PPC for a) SM module and b) VA module
4.1.3 Parity Checking Circuit
In order to detect errors in the multiple parity scheme, the predicted parity bits
should be compared with the corresponding actual parity bits. Actual parity bits
are generated by parity generating circuit. Figure 4.5 shows the parity generator



















Figure 4.5: Multiple-bit parity checker
In Figure 4.5, Z and Z̃ can be considered as the expected and the actual outputs
of one of the three modules discussed earlier. P (Z) and P (Z̃) are k-bit parities of
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Z and Z̃, respectively. The result of bit by bit comparison of P (Z) and P (Z̃) are
ORed to signal any difference which indicates an error. The parity generator is
constructed by XOR trees which contain l− 1 two-input XOR gates. Furthermore,
k two-input XOR gates are required for comparison. Total numbers of two-input
XOR and OR gates required for a parity checker are m (= k(l− 1) + k) and k− 1,
respectively.
4.1.4 Polynomial Basis Multiplier with CED
To construct a bit-serial and a bit-parallel multiplier with concurrent error detection
capability, we will use PPC embedded modules SR-P, SM-P, and VA-P. Figure 4.6
shows a bit-serial multiplier with PPC. A and B are the inputs of the multiplier.
Register D is initialized with A and its k-bit parity P (A). A parity checker can be
at each of the three locations: L1, L2 and L3. In the next section, the frequency of















Figure 4.6: Bit-serial polynomial basis multipliers with parity prediction circuit
Figure 4.7 shows a bit-parallel multiplier with PPC. In the bit-parallel multiplier
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a parity checker can be placed after each modules. Thus, there can be as many as

















A, P (A) b0
m + k
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m + k
Figure 4.7: Bit-parallel polynomial basis multipliers with parity prediction circuit
4.2 Error Detection Capability
In this section, first the error model is explained. Then the probability of error de-
tection at the output of the circuit using the multiple parity method is determined.
Finally, the frequency of the check points is discussed.
4.2.1 Error Modelling
The effect of a fault, such as a transient fault, in one location of the multiplier circuit
is modelled by XORing an error vector with the expected correct ”value” of that
location. The ith bit of the error vector of a location being one implies that the ith
bit of the value of the location has changed from 0 to 1 or vice versa due to a fault.
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If the location is one of the main components (SR-P, SM-P or VA-P), without loss
of generality we can assume that the error vector should be XORed with the output
of the component. It is worth mentioning that the parity prediction circuits, parity
generators and parity checkers should be fault free or at least self-checking [53].
Since in practice the number of parity bits, k, is much less than the size of the
input operands of the multiplier, m, the self-checking technique is feasible. In this
work, these circuits are assumed to be fault free or self-checking. It will be shown
in Section 4.3 that with a moderate number of parity bits the probability of error
detection becomes quite close to unity. As an example, for m = 163, with 8 parity
bits, the error detection probability is approximately 0.996.
Let e = (e0, e1, · · · , em+k−1) be the representation of an error of a location in the
multiplier. The first m bits of e correspond to errors in an element, say A ∈ GF (2m)
that is part of the value of that location. The remaining k bits of e correspond to
errors in the k-bit parity vector P (A). Note that although we assume the parity
prediction and the parity checking circuits to be fault free or self-checking, an error
may occur in the parity bits any where in the remainder of the multiplier circuit
such as the registers in the bit-serial implementation of the multiplier or the wires
through which the parity signals propagate. If one assumes otherwise, i.e., the
parity bits/signals are error free, then all registers and wires through which these
signals travel have to be fault free, even though some of these registers and wires
are not part of the parity prediction and checking circuits.
Since e is an (m + k)-tuple vector and the all-zero e = (0, 0, · · · , 0) corresponds
to no error, the number of possible errors is 2m+k − 1. We logically divide e into k
parts each of length l + 1 = m
k
+ 1 bits where the jth part is
(ejl, ejl+1, · · · , ejl+l−1, em+j).
In the following, we investigate which kind of errors cannot be detected by the k-bit
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parity scheme.
4.2.2 Probability of Error Detection
Let eO be an odd parity error, i.e., the number of 1’s in eO is odd. Then the parity
of at least one of the k partitions is odd. Therefore, eO can be detected by the
proposed CED method and the probability of undetected error is PrU(eO) = 0.
Let eE be a nonzero even parity error. Since k < m, there is at least one
error, eE , such that all of its partitions have even parity. Then the error cannot be
detected. Accordingly, PrU(eE) ≥ 0.
Theorem 4.1 Let k be the number of parity bits of the scheme. Suppose p is the













Proof Our proof for Theorem 4.1 follows. PrD = 1 − PrU where PrU is the
probability of undetected errors. As it is mentioned, all nonzero errors with even
parity in their partitions are undetectable. Thus, considering error vectors are
(m + k)-bit long and each of them has k partitions, first we need to compute the
probability of an (m
k
+ 1)-bit number with even parity.
Let Ei and Oi be the probabilities that an i-bit number has even parity and odd
parity, respectively. Thus, Ei = 1− Oi. Moreover, let q be the probability that a
bit of the error vector is zero, i.e., q = 1− p. We proceed in a recursive manner.
Ei+1 = qEi + pOi
= (1− p)Ei + p(1−Ei)
= (1− 2p)Ei + p.
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Let 1− 2p = A and p = B. We determine Ei for some i to find a closed formula:
E0 = 1
E1 = q
E2 = Aq + B
E3 = A
2q + AB + B
E4 = A
3q + A2B + AB + B
...
Ei = A
i−1q + Ai−2B + · · ·+ AB + B






Now, we write the expression only in terms of p:
Ei = (1− 2p)
i−1(1− p) + p
(
(1− 2p)i−1 − 1
(1− 2p)− 1
)
= (1− 2p)i−1(1− p)−
(1− 2p)i−1 − 1
2
= (1− 2p)i−1(1− p− 1/2) + 1/2
=
(1− 2p)i + 1
2
.






-bit partition of the error vector has even parity
is Ei= m
k
+1. Moreover, the partitions are independent. Thus, the probability of
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As mentioned, p is the probability of an error vector bit being one. A reduction
of p increases the probability of having an all-zero error vector. This reduction
means a reduction in the probability of (nonzero) errors, which in turn means a
reduction in the probability of undetectable errors. Thus, with a reduction in p,
the probability of error detection increases.
As it can be determined from Equation (4.4), as the number of parity bits
increases, the probability of error detection quickly approaches unity so that it
reaches 0.996 for 8 parity bits.
4.2.3 Frequency of the Check Points
Suppose that there are several multiple-bit errors in a location of the circuit of a PB
multiplier. For having an error detection capability PrD as given in Theorem 4.1,
each of the above mentioned locations in Section 4.1.4 should have a parity checker.
This causes a very high area overhead especially for bit-parallel multipliers. The
following lemma helps us reduce the number of checkers considerably.
Lemma 4.2 Suppose only a maximum of one multiple-bit error occurs per round
of a bit-serial multiplier or per slice of a bit-parallel multiplier (see Figure 4.6 and
Figure 4.7). Then any such error can be detected with the probability PrD, given
in Section 4.2.2, using a parity checker at L3 of the bit-serial multiplier or a parity
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checker before the vertical input of every VA-P and one parity checker after the
final VA-P in the bit-parallel multiplier.
Proof It should be verified if a detectable error vector can be changed to an un-
detectable one after passing through a main component and before reaching one of
the check points.
If a detectable error vector passes through an SR-P module, it can be changed
to an undetectable one. However, the check points are located so that any error
vector can reach one of the check points without passing through any SR-P mod-
ule. Therefore, one of the following cases should be considered: 1) a detectable
error vector passes through an SM-P module or 2) a detectable error vector passes
through a VA-P module or 3) both.
In the first case, if bi = 0 then regardless of the other input value, the value of
the output vector and parity are zero. This is a correct result and there is no error
anymore. If bi = 1 then the input and the output of the SM-P module are equal.
Hence, the error vector passes SM-P without any change.
In the second case, if only one of the two inputs of VA-P module has erroneous
bits, the error vector can pass the VA-P module without any change. Since a
maximum of one multiple-bit error is allowed in a round of a bit-serial multiplier
or in a slice of a bit-parallel multiplier, only one of the inputs of VA-P can be
erroneous.
In the third case, the error must occur before an SM-P module but after the
SR-P module (in the corresponding slice of a bit-parallel multiplier). Therefore,




Important performance measures for an error detection scheme include error detec-
tion capability, area and time overheads. In this section the results of our studies on
these measures are presented. The results can guide the choice of a proper number
of parity bits for design requirements.
4.3.1 Simulation-Based Fault Injection
We have injected stuck-at faults to a GF (2163) PB multiplier with k = 8 to evaluate
the error detection capability of the proposed scheme. The fault injection was
performed in a C model of the multiplier. Furthermore, the fault injection was at
the gate-level, i.e., stuck-at faults (both stuck-at 1 and stuck-at 0) were injected at
the input and output pins of the gates of the multiplier. In the proposed scheme,
a checker is placed at the end of a round of a bit-serial multiplier (or at the end
of the slice of a bit-parallel one). Moreover, the scheme can detect an error if
the error can be detected in one round of a bit-serial multiplier (or a slice of a
bit-parallel one). Fault injection in a complete multiplier of GF (2163) is extremely
time consuming. In order to reduce the time for completing experiments, faults were
injected in only one round of a bit-serial multiplier (and a slice of a bit-parallel one).
In Appendix A, more information about our procedures of the fault injections is
given. In the following, two phases of our fault injections are presented.
Single-Bit Stuck-at Faults
In this experiment, single-bit stuck-at faults were injected at the input or output
pins of gates. To inject a fault at a point, the conventional fault injection method
at a gate pin described in Section 3.5 is also used here.
In a GF (2m) PB multiplier, there are ω− 2 two-input XOR gates, m two-input
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AND gates, and m two-input XOR gates in the SR, SM and VA modules, respec-
tively, where ω is the Hamming weight of the field defining polynomial. Single-bit
stuck-at faults are injected at all input and output pins except the output pins of
AND gates of SM module because they are direct inputs of the VA module’s XOR
gates. Therefore, the number of locations for single-bit stuck-at fault injections at
a round of a bit-serial (or a slice of a bit-parallel) multiplier is 3(ω− 2) + 5m. Ad-
ditionally, for each input or output gate pin, two single-bit faults can be injected.
Hence, the number of single-bit stuck-at faults that should be injected at a round
of a bit-serial (or a slice of a bit-parallel) multiplier is 6(ω − 2) + 10m.
In this experiment, we simulated the multiplier for one million random inputs
and for every input, all the above mentioned single-bit stuck-at faults were in-
jected. The number of detected and masked faults are 656481969 and 991518031,









Single-bit 1648 1000000 100%
Multiple-bit 500 1000000 99.61%
1in one round of a bit-serial (or one slice of a bit-parallel) multiplier
Table 4.1: Percentage of error detection of the SIMP scheme for a GF (2163) PB
multiplier against stuck-at faults
Multiple-Bit Stuck-at Faults
For multiple-bit stuck-at fault injection, the location of the above mentioned single-
bit faults were randomly selected and a stuck-at 0 or stuck-at 1 was randomly
injected there. Furthermore, simulations were performed for one million random
inputs and for every input, 500 random multiple-bit stuck-at faults were injected.
It is worth mentioning that for a GF (2163) multiplier experiment, there are 824
single-bit stuck-at fault locations. The number of detected and undetected faults
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are 498047234 and 1952766, respectively. As shown in Table 4.1, the percentage of
error detection for multiple-bit stuck-at fault injections is 99.61%.
4.3.2 Time and Area Overheads
We have described the multiple-bit parity scheme by VHDL to obtain a realistic
approximation of area and time overheads. In order to reduce the number of XOR
gates in the multiplier, field defining polynomial F (x) can be chosen to be a trino-
mial or a pentanomial such that the parity of F (x) in each partition is zero, i.e.,
PFj = 0. In Section 4.4.2, the complexity of the parity prediction circuit for NIST
recommended irreducible polynomials for ECDSA is discussed.
We used Modelsim(TM) to simulate the design for checking its correct functional-
ity. We implemented the multiple parity scheme on a Xilinx Spartan 3 (XC3S5000)
FPGA using Xilinx ISE 7.1i.
Bit-Serial PB Multiplication
The circuit of a complete bit-serial multiplier with CED is shown in Figure 4.8. The
circuit consists of two major blocks: 1) PB multiplier with PPC and 2) checker.
The parity generator of the checker is used at the initialization phase to generate
the parity of input A. Note that no extra clock cycle is needed for the circuit shown
in Figure 4.8 when compared to a bit-serial PB multiplier without CED.
From the first experiment, we obtained the area overhead percentage of the
scheme for multipliers of different field sizes. The number of parity bits for this
experiment was chosen to be 8 bits since the probability of error detection was
within acceptable range for our experiment (≈ 0.996). Furthermore, the defining
polynomial of the fields used in the experiment included the NIST recommended
irreducible polynomials for ECDSA. Figure 4.9 shows the result of the experiment.



































Figure 4.8: A complete bit-serial multiplier with CED
to decrease as the size of the field increases. The area overhead does not decrease
in a strictly monotonic way because the FPGA compiler used in the experiment
optimizes the multiplier for different field sizes differently. The worst area overhead
percentage among the fields implemented is for GF (2201) and is still reasonably
low, i.e., < 12%.
In the second experiment, we implemented the scheme for m = 163 and m = 283
using the NIST recommended field defining polynomials for ECDSA F (x) = x163 +
x7 + x6 + x3 + 1 and F (x) = x283 + x12 + x7 + x5 + 1, respectively. Both of these
polynomials are quite suitable for implementation because the parity prediction
circuits of the scheme would be in the simplest form since, in a k-bit parity scheme,
4.3 Results 90























Figure 4.9: Area (i.e., slice) overhead for bit-serial PB multipliers for different size
of fields
we have:
{P (Fi) = 0 | 0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1 and 2 ≤ k ≤ 20} .
As shown in Figure 4.10, area overhead cost increases as the number of parity
bits increases. For all points in each graph depicted in the figure, a line is fitted as
follows:
for GF (2163) : overhead (%) = 0.50× (# of parity bits) + 5.94,
for GF (2283) : overhead (%) = 0.30× (# of parity bits) + 6.44.
(4.5)
As expected according to the first experiment, the slope of the fitted line for
GF (2163) is more than that for GF (2283), i.e., the area overhead increase rate vs.
parity-bit numbers in GF (2283) is lower. Furthermore, based on the experimental
results, area overhead tends to increase linearly except for very small numbers of
parity bits.
Note that Equation (4.5) implies that even if one parity is used for each infor-
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(a) GF (2163)
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(b) GF (2283)
Figure 4.10: Area overhead vs. parity-bit number
mation bit, circuit overhead is not expected to be more than 100%, which is the
overhead for the conventional dual modular redundant (DMR) scheme.
In the second experiment, we also investigated the time overhead of the GF (2163)
and GF (2283) PB multipliers for different numbers of parity bits. Since there is no
extra clock cycle, the time overhead is equal to the clock period overhead. We
obtain the clock periods from the post place and route static timing report of
Xilinx ISE. Except for four cases, there was no clock period overhead and in turn
no time overhead for the bit-serial implementation of the multipliers. These four
cases belong to the GF (2163) PB multiplier shown in Table 4.2. According to the
table, the time overheads even for these cases are small.
No. of parity bits 1 4 11 13
Time overhead (%) 12.27 4.39 15.26 4.79
Table 4.2: Nonzero time overheads for bit-serial implementation which belong to
the GF (2163) PB multiplier
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Figure 4.11: A complete bit-parallel multiplier with CED
Bit-Parallel PB Multiplication
A circuit diagram of a complete bit-parallel polynomial basis multiplier with CED
is depicted in Figure 4.11. The parity checker is very similar to that presented
in Figure 4.8. As shown in Figure 4.11, once the inputs A and B are updated,
the results of the multiplication and error detection are ready after certain amount
of delay due to the propagation of various signals through the circuit where no
clocking is used.
For bit-parallel multiplier, the first experiment was to measure the area overhead
percentage of the eight parity-bit scheme for multipliers of different field sizes. The
results show that the area overhead decreases as the field size increases (Figure 4.12).
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Figure 4.12: Area (i.e., slice) overhead for bit-parallel PB multipliers for different
size of fields
There is a major difference between the structure of bit-serial and bit-parallel
PB multipliers and this affects the area overhead considerably. A bit-serial PB
multiplier contains simple and shift registers, but a bit-parallel multiplier does not.
Basically, registers are relatively area consuming components in FPGAs. There-
fore, assuming that one wants to implement a PB multiplier for a field of size m,
the area (in terms of slices) needed for a bit-parallel PB multiplier without CED is
significantly smaller than m times the area needed for a bit-serial multiplier. Ac-
cordingly, CED overhead on a bit-parallel PB multiplier is much higher than that
on a bit-serial one. This fact can be observed easily in the experiments reported in
this section.
The second experiment was to investigate the area and time overheads’ increase
rates vs. the number of parity bits for the field GF (2163) (see Figure 4.13). The field
defining polynomial is F (x) = x163 + x7 + x6 + x3 + 1. According to Table 4.3, the
bit-parallel implementation is very area consuming; therefore, similar experiments
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 Slice Overhead
 Linear Fit of Slice Overhead
Figure 4.13: Area overhead vs. parity-bit number for the field GF (2163)
for the field GF (2283) are extremely time consuming and clearly that design does
not fit into our current FPGA. However, the area overhead results for higher values
of m are expected to be better than the result of this experiment as one can infer
from Figure 4.12, where the number of parity bits is fixed to eight.
No. of parity bits Without CED 4 8 12 16 20
Number of
required Slices
13541 19121 20049 21616 22864 24390
FPGA area
consumption (%)1
40.69 57.45 60.24 64.95 68.70 73.29
1The total number of slices in a Xilinx Spartan 3 (XC3S5000) FPGA is 33280.
Table 4.3: FPGA area consumption for a bit-parallel GF (2163) PB multiplier
Figure 4.13 illustrates that as the number of parity bits increases, the area
overhead for a bit-parallel implementation increases at a greater rate compared to
the bit-serial implementation. However, the area overhead may be still acceptable
for some applications. This is because for obtaining a sufficiently high probability
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of error detection (say ≈ 0.996), one needs only about 8 parity bits in the proposed
scheme and it results in about 50% area overhead, which is better than 100%
overhead of the DMR scheme.
In the bit-parallel implementation, the time overhead is the delay of the critical
path, i.e., the maximum propagation delay from one of the input pins to one of
the output pins. We obtain the delay of all input pins to output pins from the
post place and route static timing report of Xilinx ISE. The time overhead for the
bit-parallel implementation of a GF (2163) PB multiplier vs. number of parity bits
is given in Fig 4.14, which shows that the time overhead is generally less than 25%
when more than a couple of parity bits are used.




















Number of Parity Bits
Figure 4.14: Time overhead vs. parity-bit number for the field GF (2163)
4.4 Alternative Partitioning
In this section another partitioning of A and F is presented. The new partitioning
reduces the overhead of the parity prediction circuit of the SR module.
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As mentioned A =
∑m−1
i=0 aix
i is partitioned into k parts. As before, we assume
that m is divisible by k and l = m/k. The alternative (vertical) partitioning is
illustrated below:
a0 , a1 , a2 , · · · , ak−1 ,
ak , ak+1 , ak+2 , · · · , a2k−1 ,
... , ,
. . . , ,
... ,
a(l−1)k , a(l−1)k+1 , a(l−1)k+2 , · · · , alk−1
︸︷︷︸ ︸︷︷︸ ︸︷︷︸ ︸︷︷︸
A0 A1 A2 · · · Ak−1





ik+j = (aj , ak+j, a2k+j, · · · , a(l−1)k+j).
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4.4.1 Structure of SR Module































































where a−1 = 0.
Figure 4.15 shows the jth part of the SR module. The complete SR module is
shown in Figure 4.16. The number of gates is exactly the same as for the previous
SR module mentioned in Section 4.1.1, as only the position of the coordinates is
changed.
The following lemma discusses parity prediction in the jth part of the SR module.
Lemma 4.3 Let P (Aj) and P (A
′
j) be the input and the expected output parities of
the jth part of the SR module, respectively and PFj =
∑l−1
i=0 fik+j. Then,



















P (Aj−1) + am−1PFj if 1 ≤ j ≤ k − 1,
P (Ak−1) + am−1(PF0 + 1) if j = 0.






Therefore, for 1 ≤ j ≤ k − 1, we have:














= P (Aj−1) + am−1PFj .
4.4 Alternative Partitioning 99
Part 1
Part 0














Figure 4.16: SR module
For j = 0, we have:














= (P (Ak−1) + am−1) + am−1PF0
= P (Ak−1) + am−1(PF0 + 1).
PFj ’s can be pre-computed. Therefore, the maximum number of gates required
for the parity prediction circuit of each part of the SR module is one XOR gate.
No XOR gate is needed for the parity prediction circuit of a part of the SR module
when PF0 = 1 or PFj = 0 for 0 < j < k. Furthermore, the probability of error
detection can be computed by Theorem 4.1, since the conditions are the same.





No. of 2-input XOR









x163 + x7 + x6 + x3 + 1 0 4 15 3
x233 + x74 + 1 2 2 17 1
x283 +x12 +x7 +x5 +1 0 4 15 3
x409 + x87 + 1 2 2 17 1
x571 +x10 +x5 +x2 +1 0 2 15 1
Table 4.4: XOR counts for PPC of an SR module for NIST recommended irreducible
polynomials for ECDSA application
4.4.2 Comparison of SR-P Modules
According to Section 4.3.1, the scheme with eight partitions results in a fairly high
probability of error detection for values of m that are of interest for elliptic curve
cryptosystems. Therefore, we have divided each of corresponding NIST recom-
mended irreducible polynomials into eight partitions using our horizontal and ver-
tical partitioning methods. Table 4.4 gives the number of partitions with nonzero
parity and the number of required two-input XOR gates for PPC of the SR module
along with the NIST recommended irreducible polynomials.
As it can be seen in Table 4.4, the SR-P module is relatively area efficient in the
vertical paritioning than the horizontal partitioning. However, the SR-P module is
much less resource consuming than any of the SM-P and VA-P modules. Therefore,
the overheads resulting from the vertical partitioning are expected to be very similar
to those presented in Section 4.3 for horizontal partitioning.
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4.5 Summary
In this work, a multiple parity error detection scheme is presented for concurrent
detection of errors in polynomial basis multipliers. In this scheme, the probability
of error detection for random errors is more than 75% and it quickly approaches
unity for approximately 8 parity bits. The overhead of our implementation tends to
increase linearly as the number of parity bits increases. Results show that the area
overhead cost of the bit-serial implementation is lower than that for the bit-parallel
one. Both implementations have lower area overheads than the traditional dual
modular redundant scheme for a sufficient number of parity bits. Additionally, the
average time overhead due to the use of the scheme in bit-parallel implementations
is around 25%, while for bit-serial implementations time overheads have been ob-
served to be small to negligible. It is hoped that using the results presented in this




In the previous chapter, a parity based error detection scheme, referred to as SIMP,
for PB multipliers is presented. This chapter extends the SIMP scheme by parti-
tioning both inputs of the multiplier and considering a parity bit for each partition.
This scheme is referred to as double input multiple parity (DIMP) scheme. This
work can be applied to any finite field GF(2m). This scheme has a better error
detection capability than SIMP because the latter cannot detect errors in one of
the inputs of the multiplier. This improvement in error detection capability is
achieved with a slightly more area overhead and quite similar time overhead com-
pared to SIMP. This scheme can detect multiple-bit errors in both digit-serial and
bit-parallel polynomial basis multipliers over binary extension fields.
In this chapter, the capability of the proposed error detection schemes is eval-
uated by simulation-based fault injection. Additionally, experimental analyses of
the area and the time of the scheme are presented. Our results show that the area
overhead has a linear increasing trend as the number of parity bits increases but
the probability of undetected errors decreases very quickly. Additionally, the area
overhead for the bit-parallel implementation is considered to be in an acceptable
range, e.g., having eight and three parity bits for the first and the second inputs,
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respectively, the scheme obtains an area overhead of 55.59% which is lower than
the conventional dual modular redundant systems. The average time overhead due
to the use of the scheme in bit-parallel implementations is approximately 25%.
Towards the end of this chapter, both SIMP and DIMP schemes are also applied
to field arithmetic using dual, type I and type II optimal normal bases.
The organization of the remainder of this chapter is as follows. In Section 5.1,
the double input multiple parity scheme is investigated. The experimental results
are given in Section 5.2. Section 5.3 extends SIMP and and the scheme presented
in this chapter to dual and optimal normal Bases. Finally, Section 5.4 gives a
summary of the chapter.
Part of this work appeared in [6].
5.1 Double Input Multiple Parity (DIMP) Scheme
In the SIMP scheme, the parity bits are preserved for only one input of the PB
multiplier. Although this can detect errors on the first input (input A) and/or
inside of the multiplier with a certain probability, the errors on the second input
cannot be detected. One way to improve this situation is to consider other parity
bits for the second input operand as well. Therefore, the second input can be
similarly divided, say, into s partitions and for each partition one parity bit can be
considered. In general, the number of partitions of the first and the second inputs
can be different. Additionally, due to the structure of the scheme, this scheme
can be applied to digit-serial and bit-parallel implementations and is not suitable
and efficient for bit-serial implementations. In this work, we investigate the double
input multiple parity (DIMP) scheme using a bit-parallel implementation.
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5.1.1 Parity Prediction in DIMP
This section investigates how the parity bits of the second input, B ∈ GF (2m),
can propagate through SR, SM and VA modules. The first input, A ∈ GF (2m),
was already divided into k parts. We assume that k|m and the length of each part
is l = m
k
(see Section 4.1 for the case that m is not divisible by k). Also, the
parity propagation through the SR module for the SIMP scheme, which has been
investigated in Section 4.1.1, is summarized in Lemma 5.1.
Lemma 5.1 Suppose that A(n−1) and A(n) are the input and output of the nth SR

























j ) = a
(n−1)
jl−1 + P (A
(n−1)





where 0 ≤ j ≤ k − 1, A(0)j = Aj and a
(n−1)
−1 = 0.
Now for DIMP, let us assume that m is divisible by s and the length of each
partition is t; for the case that m is not divisible by s, the lengths of the partitions
are different but a similar argument given in the following theorem holds. Theo-
rem 5.1 helps us to predict the parity of every tth slice of the multiplier using the
parities of both inputs A and B.
Theorem 5.1 Let P (C
(q)
j ) be the parity of the j
th partition of the output of the VA
module in slice (q + 1)t for 0 ≤ q ≤ s− 1. Let P (B(q)) =
∑q
i=0 P (Bi), where P (Bi)
is the parity of the ith partition of B. Then we have:
P (C
(q)
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Proof According to Lemma 5.1, for 1 ≤ i ≤ m− 1, we have:
P (A
(i)
j ) = a
(i−1)
jl−1 + P (A
(i−1)





One can unroll the above recursive formula as follows given A
(0)
j = Aj :
P (A
(i)

























m−1P (Fj) ; 1 ≤ i ≤ m− 1.
Therefore, expression (5.1) can be rewritten as:
P (A
(i)
j ) = P (Aj) + h
(i)
j . (5.2)














Additionally, P (Cj) is the parity of the j
th partition after the VA module of the
last slice, i.e., the slice (m− 1). Accordingly, such parity of an arbitrary slice, say
r, can be computed simply by substituting m by r. In fact, we are interested in
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Substituting (5.2) to (5.3), we have:
P (Cj






P (Aj) + h
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In the following, based on the theorem, the parity prediction circuits (PPCs)
for every module are presented. Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2 show the PPCs of the
jth parts of the SR and SM modules, respectively. In Figure 5.1, P (Fj) is fixed.
Therefore, if P (Fj) = 0 then the circuit needs only three 2-input XOR gates.




the SM modules of the first two slices of the PB multiplier (i.e., for i = 0, 1) are




i = 0) is zero as well. For each SR and each SM modules, k copies of the PPCs are




































Figure 5.1: PPC of the jth part of an SR module
required. These modules along with their PPCs are hereafter referred to as SR-P2




































Figure 5.2: PPC of the jth part of an SM module
Unlike SR and SM modules, two types of PPCs are needed for VA modules. Fig-
ure 5.3(a) shows the circuit of the first type of PPCs for VA modules, which predicts
the parities related to both inputs A and B. This circuit should be incorporated
in the VA modules of every tth slice.
The second type of PPCs of VA modules only predicts the parity related to
the first input, A. The circuit of this type is shown in Figure 5.3(b) and should
be incorporated in all VA modules but every tth ones. The VA modules along
with these PPCs are the same as VA-P modules in the SIMP scheme. It is worth
mentioning that since the first slice of a PB multiplier does not contain VA module
(see Figure 1.b), the circuit shown in Fig 5.3(b) does not exist for the first slice,
i.e., for i = 0. Additionally, PVA(A
(0)
j ) = PSM(A
(0)
j ).































































Figure 5.3: PPC of the jth part of VA for (a) every tth slice, (b) all other slices
5.1.2 Polynomial Basis Multipliers with CED Using DIMP
To construct a PB multiplier with CED using the DIMP scheme, one should use an



































































Figure 5.4: One of every tth slices of the PB multiplier with CED
Furthermore, in any slice of the PB multiplier except every tth slice, VA-P
modules should be used instead of VA-P2 ones. For the purpose of error detection,
a number of parity equality checkers are also required to be placed at the end of
each slice of the PB multiplier before the first VA module and after other ones (see
Section 4.2.3 for more information about the frequency of the check points).
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Two types of checkers are needed in DIMP as shown in Figure 5.5. In the figure,
P (Z) is the k-bit predicted parity related to the first input and is available at the
end of every slice. However, P ′(Z) is the k-bit predicted parity related to the second
input and is available at every tth slice. Moreover, P (Z̃) is the k-bit actual parity.
As shown in the figure, an ordinary parity checker (OPC) only checks the equality
of the predicted parities related to input A against the actual ones. However, a
double parity checker (DPC) checks the equality of the predicted parities of both
inputs against the actual ones. DPCs are placed at the end of every tth slice after


























Figure 5.5: Double parity checker (DPC)
It is worth mentioning that one of the inputs of the second type PPC for VA
module as shown in Figure 5.3(a) is P (B(q)), where 0 ≤ q ≤ s−1. This value is the
parity of the first q + 1 parts of input B and is referred to as cumulative parity of
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Figure 5.6: Cumulative parity generator
5.1.3 CED Capability of DIMP
As mentioned in Section 4.2, suppose that the expected value of one location of
the multiplier circuit is changed due to one fault or more. Then this change can
be modelled by XORing an error vector with the expected correct value of that
location; i.e. the error model of this work is bit-flip. If the location is one of the
SR, SM or VA modules, without loss of generality we can assume that the error
vector should be XORed with the output of that module. Furthermore, the parity
prediction circuits, parity generators and parity checkers should be fault free or at
least self-checking [53]. In this work, these circuits are assumed to be fault free
although the self-checking technique is feasible because the number of parity bits
is practically much less than the size of the input operands of the multiplier. Now,
considering this error model, a multiple-bit error on input B can be detected if at
least one of the s partitions of B is not zero. Furthermore, if the parities of all
partitions of input A are zero, then errors on input B cannot be detected. This can
be easily inferred from Theorem 5.1.
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Lemma 5.2 Suppose e′ is a random error of length m that occurs on input B.
Assuming that input A of the multiplier is random, the probability of detecting the
























where p is the probability that a bit of an m-bit vector, either e′ or A, becomes one.
Proof Let event1 be that the parity of all k partitions of input A are zero. Also,
let event2 be that an m-bit error with s partitions has at least one partition with
nonzero parity. According to Theorem 4.1, the probability of having an m-bit





































On the other hand, the probability of detecting the error e′ using DIMP is:
PrD(e
′) = Pr(event1) · Pr(event2|event1) + Pr(event1) · Pr(event2|event1).
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Since Pr(event2|event1) = 0 and Pr(event2|event1) = Pr(event2), we have:
PrD(e
′) = Pr(event1) · Pr(event2),







and Pr(event2) is given in (5.5).
Now, Let us similarly assume that for a PB multiplier using the DIMP scheme
only a maximum of one multiple-bit error occurs per slice of a bit-parallel imple-
mentation, then we have:
• if errors occur on input A and/or inside the PB multiplier, they can be de-
tected with a probability given in (4.4).
• if an error occurs on input B, it can be detected with the probability given
in Lemma 5.2.
Note that the number of partitions of B, i.e., s, can be preferably chosen smaller
than that of A, i.e., k; since the parity checking mechanism in the second input is
used for detecting errors in itself, i.e., input B. Furthermore, this choice slightly
decreases the area overhead of the scheme.
5.2 Experimental Results
5.2.1 Simulation-Based Fault Injection
We injected a large number of stuck-at faults into a C model of a GF (2163) bit-
parallel PB multiplier to evaluate the error detection capability of the DIMP scheme
and compare it against SIMP. Since fault injection in a complete PB multiplier
is extremely time consuming, we performed fault injection in a slice of the PB
multiplier. We injected the faults at the inputs and the outputs of the gates of a
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slice of the PB multiplier. Additionally, to show the strength of DIMP rather than
SIMP, we performed fault injection at the bi input of the SM module as well.
In a slice of a GF (2m) PB multiplier, the number of two-input gates for SR,
SM and VA modules are (ω − 2) XOR gates, m AND gates and m XOR gates,
respectively, where ω is the Hamming weight of the field defining polynomial. Ad-
ditionally, except the outputs of AND gates of the SM module, where are the direct
inputs of XOR gates of VA modules, all other inputs and outputs can be locations
for fault injection. Therefore, considering the bi input of the SM module, the num-
ber of locations for fault injection in a slice of the PB multiplier is 3(ω−2)+5m+1.
For more information about our procedures of the fault injections, see Appendix A.
Single Stuck-at Fault Injection
For single stuck-at fault injection, every pin location was injected by two fault
values zero and one. Hence, the total number of injected faults in a slice of the
GF (2m) PB multiplier was 6(ω− 2) + 10m + 2. In this experiment, we injected all
above-mentioned faults for one million random inputs. The number of detected,
masked and undetected faults are 656517171, 992482830 and 999999 for the SIMP
scheme and 657514067, 992481934 and 3999 for the DIMP scheme, respectively.









SIMP 1650 1000000 99.8479%
DIMP 1650 1000000 99.9994%
Table 5.1: Single stuck-at fault injection in a slice of a bit-parallel GF (2163) PB
multiplier
In fact, SIMP cannot detect errors on input B; however, it can detect the errors
on bi’s inside of the SM module with the probability given in (4.4). In Figure 5.7, a
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single-bit error on the main input of the SM module denoted by cross sign cannot
be detected by SIMP but errors on other locations denoted by circle sign can be







Figure 5.7: Possible fault locations in bi input of the SM module
According to Table 5.1, the percentage of error detection of DIMP is higher
than SIMP, although DIMP cannot detect single-bit errors on input B when the
parities of all partitions of input A are zero (see Section 5.1.3).
Multiple Stuck-at Fault Injection
For each multiple stuck-at fault injection, we randomly chose a number of above-
mentioned locations, i.e., 3(ω−2)+5m+1 locations, in a slice of the PB multiplier
and then we randomly injected either stuck-at 0 fault or stuck-at 1 fault at each cho-
sen location. In this experiment, 500 random multiple stuck-at faults were injected
for each of 1000000 million random inputs. This experiment was very time con-
suming since for each multiple stuck-at fault injection all above-mentioned locations
should be accessed. The number of detected and undetected faults are 498046872
and 1953128 for SIMP and 498472548 and 1527452 for DIMP, respectively. Ac-
cording to the results of the experiments, which are presented in Table 5.2, DIMP
has a higher percentage of error detection compared to SIMP.









SIMP 500 1000000 99.6094%
DIMP 500 1000000 99.6945%
Table 5.2: Multiple stuck-at fault injection in a slice of a bit-parallel GF (2163) PB
multiplier
Furthermore, we performed the multiple fault injections in an alternative method.
In this experiment, we randomly chose 2 to 5 locations from the above-mentioned
locations in a slice of the PB multiplier and then we randomly injected either stuck-
at 0 fault or stuck-at 1 fault at each chosen location, i.e., the Hamming wight of
our injected error vectors were more than 1 and less than 6. Similarly, in this
experiment, we injected 500 random multiple stuck-at faults for each of 1000000
million random input pairs. The reason for performing this experiment is that
low weight faults may be more probable in real circumstances. The number of
detected, masked and undetected faults are 382881592, 97749191 and 19369217 for
SIMP, and 383212154, 97748343 and 19039503 for DIMP, respectively. The results









SIMP 500 1000000 95.18%
DIMP 500 1000000 95.27%
Table 5.3: Injection of low weight multiple stuck-at faults in a slice of a bit-parallel
GF (2163) PB multiplier
5.2.2 Analysis of Time and Area Overheads
A circuit diagram of a complete bit-parallel PB multiplier with CED is depicted in
Figure 5.8. The input value of the very first slice is input A along with its parity
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Checker























































































Figure 5.8: A complete bit-parallel multiplier with CED
P (A) generated by a parity generator. In the first SR-P2 and SM-P2 modules, the
inputs related to parity prediction of input B are initialized with zero vectors as
discussed in Section 5.1.1. The parity checkers OPC and DPC are same as those
presented in Figure 5.5. As shown in Figure 5.8, an OPC is located at the end of
every slice except every tth slice, where a DPC is located. Additionally, once the
inputs A and B are updated, the results of the multiplication and error detection
are ready after certain amount of delay due to the propagation of various signals
through the circuit.
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We have described the DIMP scheme by VHDL to obtain a realistic approx-
imation of area and time overheads. As it can be inferred from Lemma 5.1 and
Theorem 5.1, choosing the field defining polynomial F (x) in such a way that the
parity of F (x) in each partition is zero, i.e., PFj = 0, slightly reduces the number
of XOR gates in parity prediction circuits. Additionally, choosing F (x) to be a tri-
nomial or a pentanomial reduces the number of XOR gates in the design and make
the entire design smaller. After RTL coding, to check the correct functionality of
the design, Modelsim(TM) was used. Furthermore, we implemented the scheme on
a Xilinx Spartan 3 (XC3S5000) FPGA using Xilinx ISE 7.1i.
The first experiment was to measure the area and time overheads of the DIMP
scheme for a GF (2163) multiplier for different numbers of parity bits of the first
input while the number of parity bits of the second input was fixed to three. We
implemented the scheme using one of the NIST recommended field defining poly-
nomials for ECDSA F (x) = x163 +x7 +x6 +x3 +1. This polynomial is very suitable
for implementation because the parities of all of its partitions are zero when the
number of the partitions ranges from 2 to 20.
To have a realistic impression about area consumption of the DIMP schemes,
we present Table 5.4 which investigates the number of required FPGA slices and
the area consumption percentage of the scheme.
No. of parity bits NoCED 4 8 12 16 20
Number of required Slices 13541 19679 21069 22497 24518 26018
FPGA area consumption (%)1 40.69 59.13 63.30 67.60 73.67 78.18
1The total number of slices in a Xilinx Spartan 3 (XC3S5000) FPGA is 33280.
Table 5.4: FPGA area consumption for a bit-parallel GF (2163) PB multiplier
As shown in Figure 5.9, the area overhead increases as the number of parity
bits increases. For all points in the graph depicted in the figure, a line is fitted as
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follows:
for GF (2163) : overhead (%) = 3.47× (# of parity bits) + 25.09. (5.6)
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Figure 5.9: Area overhead of DIMP vs. parity-bit number for the field GF (2163)
Based on the experimental results and as it can be inferred from (5.6), area
overhead tends to increase linearly except for very small numbers of parity bits.
Furthermore, the area overhead of the SIMP and the DIMP schemes are com-
pared in Figure 5.10. The results for SIMP are obtained from [7]. As expected, the
area overhead of DIMP is more than SIMP in similar implementations, however,
the difference is not significant. Additionally, the area overhead is in an acceptable
range because for obtaining a sufficiently high probability of error detection (say
≈ 0.997), one needs only eight parity bits for the first input and three parity bits for
the second one in the proposed scheme. This results in about 55% area overhead,
which is lower than 100% overhead of the DMR scheme.
We also investigated the time overheads of the GF (2163) PB multipliers for
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Figure 5.10: Area overhead DIMP vs. SIMP for the field GF (2163)
different numbers of parity bits as shown in Figure 5.11. The time overhead of
the bit-parallel implementation is the delay of the critical path, i.e., the maximum
propagation delay from one of the input pins to one of the output pins. We obtain
the delays of all input pins to output pins from the post place and route static
timing report of Xilinx ISE. Results show that the time overheads are generally
less than 30% when more than two parity bits are used.
In the second experiment, we fixed the number of parity bits of the first input
to eight bits and measured the area and time overheads of DIMP when the number
of parity bits for the second input ranges from 3 to 20. As shown in Figure 5.12(a),
the area overhead increases slightly in this range, i.e., less than 2%. Additionally,
as shown in Figure 5.12(b), the range of changes in the time overhead is not very
significant, i.e., less than 15%, and is in a similar range as the time overhead of the
first experiment.
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Figure 5.11: Time overhead vs. parity-bit number for the field GF (2163)
5.3 Extending SIMP and DIMP to Dual and Nor-
mal Bases
In this section, the SIMP and DIMP schemes are extended to dual and normal
bases (type I and type I optimal normal bases). In the following sections, we divide
the first input of the multiplier, i.e., input A, into k parts. The length of each part
is l = m
k
for DB and ONB2 and is l = m+1
k
for ONB1. Moreover, the second input
B is divided into s parts in DIMP. Similarly, the length of each part is t = m
s
for
DB and ONB2 and is t = m+1
s
for ONB1(see Section 4.1 for the cases that m or
m + 1 are not divisible by k or s).
5.3.1 SIMP and DIMP in Dual Basis
As mentioned in Section 2.1, suppose that the set {y0, y1, · · · , ym−1} is the dual of
the polynomial basis {x0, x1, · · · , xm−1}. Hence, A ∈ GF (2m) can be represented
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Figure 5.12: Area and time overheads of DIMP vs. parity-bit number of the second
input for the field GF (2163)





Moreover, for A, B, C ∈ GF (2m) we have:
CDB = BPBADB
= b0ADB + b1xADB + · · ·+ bm−1x
m−1ADB.
Hence, we can implement DB multiplications using a similar architecture as PB
ones. Given that A(n−1) and A(n) are input and output of an SR module, respec-
tively, we have: A(n) = xA(n−1). Also, VA and SM modules are same as those in a
PB multiplier. As an example, Figure 5.13 shows the nth slice of a bit-parallel DB
multiplier, where 1 ≤ n ≤ m− 1 and A(0) = A and C(0) = b0A.








Figure 5.13: A slice of a bit-parallel DB multiplier
SIMP in Dual Basis
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ym−1, j = k − 1.






































jl + P (A
(n−1)
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′(n−1)
(j+1)l , 0 ≤ j ≤ k − 2,
a
′(n−1)
(k−1)l + P (A
(n−1)
k−1 ) + P
(n−1)











and 1 ≤ n ≤ m − 1. Moreover, ω is the
Hamming wight of the field defining polynomial F (x) and θi’s contain the indices
of the ω − 2 nonzero coefficients of F (x) other than f0 and fm.
According to Figure 5.13, we can write:
C(n) = C(n−1) + bnA
(n).












j ) = P (C
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b0P (Aj), n = 0, 0 ≤ j ≤ k − 1,
P (C
(n−1)
j ) + bna
′(n−1)
jl + bnP (A
(n−1)
j ) + bna
′(n−1)
(j+1)l , 1 ≤ n ≤ m− 1, 0 ≤ j ≤ k − 2,
P (C
(n−1)
j ) + bna
′(n−1)
(k−1)l + bnP (A
(n−1)
k−1 ) + bnP
(n−1)
FA , 1 ≤ n ≤ m− 1, j = k − 1.
Now, the parity of each partition of the output of a VA module in each slice can
be computed using the information of the previous slice. In SIMP, this should be
compared against the actual parity of that part.
DIMP in Dual Basis
Let us write (5.7) in an iterative manner for 1 ≤ n ≤ m− 1 as follows:
P (A
(n)















FA, j = k − 1.

























j ) = P (Aj) + h
′(n)
j . (5.9)
Now, we consider s partitions for input B. In DIMP, we would like to compute
the predicted parity of each partition of the output of every tth VA module based
on the parities of both inputs A and B. Therefore, after unrolling (5.8) we can
have an expression similar to (5.3) as follows:

















where 0 ≤ q ≤ s− 1.
Substituting (5.9) in (5.10) and similar to (5.4), for 0 ≤ j ≤ k − 1 and 0 ≤ n ≤
m− 1 we have:
P (Cj







where P (B(q)) =
∑q
i=0 P (Bi) and P (Bi) is the parity of the i
th partition of B.
5.3.2 SIMP and DIMP in Type I Normal Basis
As mentioned in Section 3.4.3, an element A ∈ GF (2m), for certain values of m,




Alternatively, we can have A =
∑m
i=0 âix
i, where â0 = 0. Let B ∈ GF (2m) also be
represented in ONB1. Then multiplying A and B, we have:












j and < j − 1 >= j − 1 mod m + 1 (see
Section 3.4.3). Hence, an ONB1 multiplier can be constructed with an architecture
similar to that of PB. However, the SR module performs a rotation or cyclic shift
such that the MSB rotates back to the LSB position. Figure 5.14 shows a slice of
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Figure 5.14: A slice of a bit-parallel ONB1 multiplier
It is worth mentioning that the intermediate and final results of the multipli-
cation are (m + 1) bits long. Therefore, as mentioned in Section 3.4.3, we should
XOR the LSB of C with its other bits to have the final result of the multiplication
in ONB1 representation.
SIMP in ONB1
As mentioned earlier, we divide input A into k parts. The length of each part
is l = m+1
k




j are the j
th parts of A(n−1) and A(n),
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where < jl + n− 1 >= jl + n− 1 mod m + 1.
Now applying parity function P (.), we have:
P (A
(n)































<jl−1> + P (A
(n−1)




where 0 ≤ j ≤ k − 1.
Using (5.8) and following a similar procedure as in Section 5.3.1, we have:
P (C
(n)
j ) = P (C
(n−1)
j ) + b̂nâ
(n−1)
<jl−1> + b̂nP (A
(n−1)
j ) + b̂nâ
(n−1)
(j+1)l−1,
where 0 ≤ j ≤ k − 1, 1 ≤ n ≤ m and C(0)j = 0.
In SIMP, we compare the predicted parity of the jth part with its actual parity
after every VA module and before the first one (in bit-parallel implementation).
DIMP in ONB1
In DIMP, the first input is partitioned same as SIMP and the second input is
divided into s where the length of each partition is t = m+1
s
. Now, using (5.12), for
0 ≤ j ≤ k − 1 and 1 ≤ n ≤ m we have:
P (A
(n)





<jl−1> + P (A
(g)
j ) + â
(g)
(j+1)l−1
= P (Aj) + ĥ
(n)
j ,







<jl−1> + P (A
(g)
j ) + â
(g)
(j+1)l−1. Following a similar procedure as
in Section 5.3.1, for 0 ≤ j ≤ k − 1 an 0 ≤ q ≤ s− 1 we have:
P (Cj








where P (B(q)) =
∑q
i=0 P (Bi) and P (Bi) is the parity of the i
th partition of B.
Using (5.13), one can compare the parity of the jth part of the output of a VA
module at every tth slice of the multiplier with its actual parity.
5.3.3 SIMP and DIMP in Type II Normal Basis
As mentioned in Section 3.4.3, to represent an element A ∈ GF (2m) in type II
normal basis (ONB2), the following set can be used:
{
γ + γ−1, γ2 + γ−2, γ3 + γ−3, · · · , γm + γ−m
}
,
where γ is a normal element in the field. Suppose that A, B ∈ GF (2m). Then













where â0 = 0.













One way to implement the multiplication mentioned in expression (5.14) is in a
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Figure 5.15: A bit-parallel ONB2 multiplier
In the above figure, module SRn receives input A and computes A
(n) according
to (5.14). Considering that â|n−i| = 0 when n = i, the number of XOR gates in
each SRn module is m + 1. Table 5.3.3 shows the number of 2-input gates needed
for the multiplier shown in Figure 5.15.
Module Number of gates
2-input AND 2-input XOR
SRn — m(m− 1)
SM m2 —
VA — m(m− 1)
Total m2 2m(m− 1)
Table 5.5: The number of 2-input gates needed for the bit-parallel ONB2 multiplier
Note that the first input A is divided into k parts in the SIMP and DIMP
schemes and the second input B is divided into s parts in DIMP. The length of
each part is l = m
k
for the first input and t = m
s
for the second input, respectively.
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SIMP in ONB2















Let us compute the parity of each part of the first SR module, i.e., SR1, directly





























+ â||(j+1)l|| + â||(j+1)l+1||
= âjl + â|1+jl| + â||(j+1)l|| + â||(j+1)l+1||.












â1 + âl + âl+1, j = 0,
âjl + âjl+1 + â(j+1)l + â(j+1)l+1, 1 ≤ j ≤ k − 2,
â(k−1)l + â(k−1)l+1, j = k − 1.
(5.15)
Therefore, the PPC of each partition can be constructed using three 2-input
XOR gates at maximum. Now, we compute the parities of the other SR modules
as follows:






















= â|n−1−jl−1| + â|n−(j+1)l| + â||n−1+jl+1|| + â||n+(j+1)l||.













+ â|n−jl−2| + â|n−(j+1)l| + â||n+jl|| + â||n+(j+1)l||. (5.16)
Similar to PB, DB and ONB1, we have:
P (C
(n)
j ) = P (C
(n−1)
j ) + b̂nP (A
(n)
j ),
where 0 ≤ j ≤ k − 1, 1 ≤ n ≤ m and C(0)j = 0.

































Figure 5.16: Parity prediction strategy for SIMP in ONB2
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DIMP in ONB2




















g=2 â|g−jl−2| + â|g−(j+1)l| + â||g+jl|| + â||g+(j+1)l||, 2 ≤ n ≤ m.









0, n = 1,
∑n
g=2 â|g−jl−2| + â|g−(j+1)l| + â||g+jl|| + â||g+(j+1)l||, 2 ≤ n ≤ m.
















Now, similar to PB, DB and NB, for 0 ≤ j ≤ k − 1 an 0 ≤ q ≤ s− 1 we have:
P (Cj










where P (B(q)) =
∑q
i=0 P (Bi) and P (Bi) is the parity of the i
th partition of B.
5.4 Summary
In this chapter, a concurrent error detection scheme, referred to as DIMP, is pre-
sented for polynomial basis multipliers. In this scheme, multiple parity bits are
used for both inputs of the multiplier. The scheme can detect errors in both inputs
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and inside of the multiplier with a probability of more than 75% using two party
bits for each input. This probability approaches unity as the number of parity bits
of the inputs increases. Results of our bit-parallel implementation show that the
area overhead has an increasing trend. However, this overhead is lower than that
of the traditional dual modular redundant scheme for a sufficient number of parity
bits. Furthermore, the average time overhead due to the use of the scheme in the
bit-parallel implementations is around 25%. In this chapter, the SIMP and DIMP
schemes are also extended to finite field multipliers that use a dual or an optimal
normal basis.
Chapter 6
Linear Code Based Error
Detection Schemes
In the previous chapters, RESO based and parity based schemes are used for de-
tecting errors. This chapter presents three schemes for the detection of errors in
both bit-serial and bit-parallel polynomial basis multipliers over binary extension
fields based on the scaling technique (see Chapter 1). The proposed schemes can
be applied to any finite field GF (2m). In these schemes, we use linear codes. Such
codes have also been used in [27]. Important differences between this work and [27]
are as follows. First, the error model of this work is more generic and the error can
occur in any location of the circuit. Secondly, this work gives much more flexibil-
ity to choose the field defining and the code generator polynomials. This leads to
a reduction in the number of redundant bits and in turn a reduction in the area
overhead.
In this chapter, the error detection probability of the code presented in this work
is investigated. Also, the error detection capabilities of the schemes are evaluated
by a number of simulation-based fault injections. Among three schemes presented
in this chapter, one has a similar percentage of error detection as SIMP and the
134
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other two schemes have slightly better percentage of error detection compared to
DIMP. Furthermore, the area and time overheads of the schemes for both bit-serial
and bit-parallel implementations are presented. Results show that, in our bit-serial
implementations for eight redundant bits, the area overheads are in a reasonable
rang, i.e., lower than dual modular redundant systems, and the time overheads are
quite small, i.e., less than 15%. In bit-parallel implementations, however, the time
and area overheads of only one of the schemes are in the acceptable range.
The organization of this chapter is as follows. In Section 6.1, a class of linear
codes, denoted as L, is presented. Three concurrent error detection schemes are
presented in Section 6.2. Using one of the schemes, namely the single-input encod-
ing, we develop error detectable bit-serial and bit-parallel multiplier structures in
Section 6.3. The error detection capability of the single-input encoding scheme is
then investigated in Section 6.4. Our second scheme is explained in Section 6.5.
In Section 6.6, the third scheme is discussed. The time and area overheads of the
schemes are presented in Section 6.8. Finally, Section 6.9 gives a summary of the
chapter.
Part of this work has been presented in [8].
6.1 A Class of Linear Codes: L Code
In an (n, m) block code, the input information sequence is divided into m-bit blocks
and each block is encoded to an n-bit codeword (n > m). One important class of
block codes is linear codes. These are extensively used in communication appli-
cations for correcting/detecting errors in transmission channels. Here, the binary
linear codes are considered for detecting errors in the polynomial basis multipliers.
In the simplest form, an (n, m) block code is linear if and only if the modulo-2
addition of two codewords is also a codeword.
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Let V = (v0, v1, · · · , vn−1) be a codeword. A polynomial whose coefficients are
the components of V , is said to be a code polynomial. A code polynomial of degree
up to n− 1 is generated with a polynomial of degree n−m of the following form:
g(x) = g0 + g1x + g2x
2 + · · ·+ gn−m−1x
n−m−1 + xn−m,
where gi ∈ GF (2). Polynomial g(x) is called a generator polynomial. Every code
polynomial in the code is a multiple of g(x). In fact, our (n, m) linear code L
maps an element of a finite field GF (2m) to an element of a commutative ring
with modulus F (x) = f(x)g(x), where f(x) is the irreducible polynomial used for
representing the elements of GF (2m). Note that, in this chapter, f(x) and F (x)
are the field defining polynomial and the modulus of the ring, respectively.
It is worth mentioning that the well-known cyclic code has the corresponding
modulus as xn − 1. If one wants to use cyclic codes to encode the elements of the
field, then f(x)g(x) = xn − 1. Therefore, for a given f(x), this limits the number
of choices of g(x) and n.
6.2 Concurrent Error Detection Schemes
Errors may be caused by different types of faults such as open faults, short (bridg-
ing) faults, and/or stuck-at faults. Furthermore, the faults can be transient or
permanent. In this chapter, we investigate three schemes for detecting random
errors.
In the first scheme, which lays foundation of discussions for the other schemes,
only one of the inputs of the PB multiplier is encoded, i.e., it is multiplied by
generator g(x). The second input is not encoded. In the second scheme, both inputs
are encoded. In general, they can be encoded with two different generators, g1(x)
and g2(x). The first and the second schemes are referred to as single-input encoding
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(SIE) and double-input encoding (DIE), respectively. In the third scheme, referred
to as hybrid scheme, the SIMP scheme presented in Chapter 4 is used along with
the encoding scheme. In other words, one of the inputs is divided into a number of
partitions and a parity bit for each partition is considered and preserved throughout
the multiplication. Additionally, the second input is encoded by a generator g′(x).
As expected, DIE has better error detection capability than SIE but its area
overhead is higher. Nevertheless, the probability of error detection of SIE can be
within an acceptable range because for some applications, for example in an elliptic
curve cryptographic processor, the second input either comes from other operations
such as adders and multipliers or comes as the direct input to the multiplier. In
the first case, if the previous operation has an error detection circuitry, its output,
which is the second input of the current multiplier, is expected to be error free. In
the second case, one can use a concurrent error detection technique for the input
of the multiplier once to avoid faulty inputs. On the other hand, it turns out that
the hybrid scheme has similar error detection capability as DIE and it also has
significantly lower area overhead. Depending on the further use of the multiplier’s
output, the PB multiplier with one of these schemes can produce either an encoded
output, i.e., multiplied by only one generator, or an unencoded output.
6.3 SIE Based Error Detectable Multipliers
As mentioned in Section 6.1, a PB multiplier can be constructed with three types
of modules: 1) SR, 2) SM, and 3) VA. In the following, (n, m) L codes are applied
to the inputs of these modules to obtain error detectable multipliers. For bit-serial
implementation, clearly, the size of registers should increase from m bits to n bits.
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6.3.1 SM and VA Modules
Suppose that an (n, m) L code is used and g(x) is the generator polynomial. Let
A, B, S and P ∈ GF (2m) and b ∈ GF (2), where scalar multiplication b.A = P and
vector addition A + B = S. Suppose A′, B′, S ′ and P ′ ∈ GF (2n) are the results of
encoding A, B, S and P , respectively. Thus, for scalar multiplication we have:
b.A′ = b.Ag = Pg = P ′,
and for vector addition we have:
A′ + B′ = Ag + Bg = (A + B)g = Sg = S ′.
Accordingly, for using L codes, the sizes of SM and VA modules increase from
m bits to n bits each.
6.3.2 SR Module
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polynomial, g(x), over GF (2) of degree n −m is used for encoding. The encoded








In an SR module with unencoded input, we have:
Us(x) = xU(x) mod f(x).












Figure 6.1: SR module: (a) with unencoded input, SR depends on f(x), (b) with























= xU(x) + um−1f(x).
(6.1)
On the other hand, for encoded inputs to SR module we have:
V (x) = U(x)g(x). (6.2)
Thus, using (6.1) and (6.2), for input V (x) the output of the SR module is:
Vs(x) = Us(x)g(x) = xU(x)g(x) + um−1f(x)g(x)
= xV (x) + um−1F (x).
(6.3)
Since F (x) can be considered to be fixed, it can be pre-computed. On the other
hand, vn−1 = um−1.gn−m and gn−m = 1, thus:
vn−1 = um−1. (6.4)
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Therefore, using (6.3) and (6.4) we have:
Vs(x) = xV (x) + vn−1F (x). (6.5)
In (6.5), F (x) is a reducible polynomial but similar to the case of irreducible
polynomial the following remark holds.
Remark 6.1 Let ω(F ) be the Hamming weight of F (x). The number of XOR gates
required for constructing the SR module with encoded input, shown in Figure 6.2,











Figure 6.2: SR module with encoded input
6.3.3 Bit-serial and Bit-parallel Polynomial Basis Multipli-
ers
To construct a bit-serial and a bit-parallel multiplier with concurrent error detection
capability, we will use updated versions of SR, SM, and VA modules with encoded
input. Figure 6.3(a) shows a bit-serial multiplier with concurrent error detection
(CED) capability. For multiplying A and B with CED capability, register D is
initialized with encoded A, i.e., A′. An error checker can be placed at each of the
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three locations: L1, L2 and L3. In the next section, the frequency of check points
will be discussed.
Figure 6.3(b) shows a bit-parallel multiplier with CED capability. In the bit-
parallel multiplier an error checker can be placed after each modules. Thus, there










































Figure 6.3: Polynomial-basis multiplication
6.3.4 L Code Encoders and Checkers
Encoders, decoders and/or checkers of linear codes are well studied in the literature,
e.g., see [50] for shift register based architecture.
For encoding, data (i.e., an element of GF (2m)) is multiplied by generator poly-
nomial, g(x). The encoder can be implemented in serial fashion using shift registers
and combinational gates or in parallel fashion using only combinational circuits. In
this work, we only consider the parallel one, since it is much faster. For parallel
implementation of an encoder, a parallel multiplier that multiplies the data by a
generator g(x) should be used.
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To check whether an n-tuple at a certain location in the circuit is a codeword,
a checker is placed at that point. A checker, basically, divides the polynomial
corresponding to the n-tuple by the generator polynomial, g(x), of the L code and
if the division has a nonzero remainder, an error signal is given. Again, checkers can
be implemented in serial fashion using linear feedback shift registers or in parallel
fashion using only combinational logic. For parallel implementation, a parallel
divider can be used.
6.4 Error Detection Capability
In this section, our error model and the probability of an undetected error of the
SIE scheme are given. The frequency of the check points is also discussed.
6.4.1 Error Modelling
Similar to Section 4.2, the error model in this work is a bit-flip model. To illustrate
the model, suppose that the error free value of a location, say L, of a polynomial
basis multiplier is an n-tuple, say v = (v0, v1, · · · , vn−1). An error vector is also an
n-tuple, say e = (e0, e1, · · · , en−1). The number of possible errors is 2
n − 1. The
erroneous value of the location L is ve = v + e, where ’+’ is bitwise XOR. In other
words, an error is a modulo-2 additive term at a certain location of a PB multiplier
and the ith bit of the error vector e being one implies that the ith bit of the value of
the location L has changed from 0 to 1 or vice versa. If the location is one of the
modules (SR, SM or VA), without loss of generality we can assume that the error
vector should be XORed with the output of the component.
Note that the encoders and checkers should be fault free or at least self checking
[53]. Since in practice the number of redundant bits, n−m, is expected to be much
less than the size of the input operands of the multiplier, m, the self checking
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technique is feasible. In this work, for simplicity we assume that these encoders
and decoders are error free. It will be shown in Section 6.8 that with a moderate
number of redundant bits the probability of error detection becomes quite close to
unity.
6.4.2 Probability of an Undetected Error
For the purpose of error detection, a received n-tuple should be checked if it is still
a codeword or not. Therefore, based on our error model, any nonzero error that is
a multiple of the generator polynomial g(x) cannot be detected. In other words,
any nonzero error vector from the set of all codewords is an undetectable error.
Let the probability of error detection and the probability of an undetected error
be referred to as PrD and PrU , respectively. Clearly, PrD = 1−PrU . Suppose Wi
is the number of codewords of weight i in an (n, m) L code, i.e., Wi is the number
of codewords that contain i ones. The probability of an undetected error can be
computed using such weight distribution of the code. As mentioned, an undetected






where p is the probability of a bit of error vector being one.
The weight distribution is known for some special codes such as Hamming codes
and Reed-Solomon codes, however, the distribution is not known for the one we use
in this work. Hence, a closed form for PrU cannot be obtained and the probability of
an undetected error is investigated by simulation. In this simulation, we generated
a large number (one million) of error vectors. These vectors were generated based
on the error model discussed in Section 6.4.1. In other words, the probability of
having one bit of the vector being one is p. Then we investigated how many of these
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error vectors cannot be detected. As mentioned in the previous section, assuming
that v is an error free value of a location and e is the error vector in that location,
we have ve = v + e. Since v is a valid codeword, it is divisible by g(x). Therefore,
ve becomes a valid codeword if and only if e is a valid one, i.e., e is divisible by
g(x). As a result, to investigate the probability of an undetected error for the L
code, we need to determine the probability of having an error vector as a valid
codeword of the code. Figure 6.4 shows the result of our simulation for (167, 163),
(169, 163) and (171, 163) L codes with generator polynomials g(x) = x4 + x + 1,
g(x) = x6 + x + 1, and g(x) = x8 + x4 + x3 + x2 + 1, respectively.
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Figure 6.4: Probability of an undetected error vs. p
A well-known upper bound for the probability of an undetected error for some
(n, m) codes such as the Hamming code is 2−(n−m). Here, the numbers of redundant
bits are 4, 6 and 8, and the dashed and dotted lines in Figure 6.4 show the values
2−4, 2−6 and 2−8, respectively. As it can be seen in the figure, the values of PrU
are either smaller than or quite close to the bounds for all three cases.
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6.4.3 Frequency of Check Points
Similar to Section 4.2.3, suppose that there are several multiple-bit errors in a lo-
cation of the circuit of a PB multiplier. For having an error detection capability
PrD as discussed in previous section, each of the above mentioned locations in Sec-
tion 6.3.3 should have a checker. This requires a very high area overhead especially
for bit-parallel multipliers. The following lemma enables us reduce the number of
checkers considerably.
Lemma 6.1 Suppose only a maximum of one multiple-bit error occurs per round of
a bit-serial multiplier or per slice of a bit-parallel multiplier (see Figure 6.3). Then
any such error can be detected with probability PrD, discussed in Section 6.4.2,
using a parity checker at L3 of the bit-serial multiplier or a parity checker before
the vertical input of every VA and one parity checker after the final VA in the
bit-parallel multiplier.
The proof can be found in Section 4.2.3.
6.5 Double-Input Encoding (DIE)
Having only one input of the PB multiplier encoded can be of concern. If the
second input of the multiplier becomes erroneous, it cannot be detected. One
way to improve this situation is to encode both input operands. In general, the
generators for encoding inputs can be different. However, there are some issues
with regard to choosing the generators that need to be dealt with and they are
briefly discussed in Section 6.5.2.
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6.5.1 Polynomial Basis Multipliers with CED Capability
In the double-input encoding, input A is encoded by the generator g1(x) and B
by g2(x). Let C = A · B mod f(x), where f(x) is the field defining polynomial.
Multiplying each side by g1(x)g2(x), we obtain:
Cg1g2 = ABg1g2 mod fg1g2.
Hence,
Eg1g2(C) = Eg1(A)Eg2(B) mod F(x),
where F(x) = f(x)g1(x)g2(x) and Eg(Z) implies that Z is encoded by generator g.
Let the degrees of g1(x) and g2(x) be r1 and r2, respectively. Clearly, the degree of
F(x) is N = m + r1 + r2.
An SR module can be constructed using (6.5) and by replacements of F (x) and
n with F(x) and N , respectively. To construct a bit-serial multiplier and/or a
bit-parallel multiplier with concurrent error detection capability, we use updated
versions of SR, SM, and VA modules in a very similar manner as shown in Figure 6.3.
Here, the number of rounds of the bit-serial multiplier and the number of slices of
the bit-parallel multiplier are m+ r2 each. Figure 6.5 shows a complete bit-parallel
multiplier with CED using the DIE scheme.
6.5.2 Error Detection Using DIE
Like Section 6.4.1, here, the bit-flip error model is assumed. As shown in Figure 6.5,
for the purpose of error detection, checkers that use the generator g1 are placed in
the same locations as discussed in Section 6.3.3. If there is no error in the circuit,
then the output value of the last checker that uses the generator g1 is Cg2 = ABg2.
Therefore, one more checker that uses the generator g2 should be placed at the
output of the last checker. Then the final result of the multiplication is the output




















































Figure 6.5: A complete bit-parallel multiplier with CED using the DIE scheme
of the checker that used the generator g2. Assuming that only a maximum of
one multiple-bit error occurs per round of a bit-serial multiplier or per slice of a
bit-parallel multiplier, we have:
• if an error occurs on input B and the error is a multiple of g2, it cannot be
detected.
• if errors occur on input A and/or inside the PB multiplier and they are not
multiples of g1, they are detected. If they are multiples of g1 but the output
of the last checker that used generator g1 is not a multiple of g2, the errors
are detected as well. Otherwise, they are not detected.
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Note that g2 can be preferably chosen such that its degree is smaller than that
of g1. Polynomial g2 is mainly used for detecting errors in input B although it
affects the error detection of the entire multiplier circuit. Furthermore, this choice
decreases the area overhead of the scheme.
6.6 Hybrid Scheme
As presented in Section 6.8, the parallel implementations of the SIE and the DIE
schemes have high area overheads. In this section, we present a hybrid scheme whose
error detection capability is similar to the DIE scheme but the area overhead of
the parallel implementation is much lower and the time overhead appears to be
reasonable for some practical applications.
6.6.1 Polynomial Basis Multipliers with CED Capability
This scheme combines the SIMP scheme and input encoding scheme discussed
above. In this hybrid scheme, input B is encoded by the generator g′(x), where the
degree of g′(x) is r′. Then A′ =’0 · · ·0A’ is divided into k parts and a parity bit is
assigned to each partition, where the number of appended zeros is r′. The reason of
extending A before partitioning follows. Considering C = A · B mod f(x), where
f(x) is the field defining polynomial with degree m, we multiply each side by g′(x)
as follows:
Cg′ = ABg′ mod fg′.
Let F ′ = fg′. Since the modulus (F ′) is of degree m + r′ and we use a bit-level
architecture for multiplication (see Figure 6.3), all the intermediate and the final
results are of degree m + r′ − 1. Therefore, we extend the size of input A before
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partitioning. Now, the hybrid scheme can be described by the following equation:
{Pk(Eg′(C)), Eg′(C)} =
{Pk(A
′), A′} · Eg′(B) mod {Pk(F
′),F ′} ,
(6.6)
where Eg′(Z) implies that Z is encoded by generator g
′ and {Pk(Z), Z} is a vector
and implies that the SIMP scheme with k partitions is used. In this scheme the
size of SM and VA modules should be extended to m + r′ + k.
Lemma 6.2 Let Vs(x) =
∑m+r′−1
i=0 vsix
i and V (x) =
∑m+r′−1
i=0 vix
i be the output
and input of the SR module, respectively. Additionally, suppose the SR module





i. Then in the hybrid scheme,

















[Pk(Vs)]j = vjl−1 + [P (V )]j + v(j+1)l−1 + vm+r′−1[P (F
′)]j,
(6.7)
where 0 ≤ j ≤ k − 1, v−1 = 0, l = ⌈
m+r′
k
⌉ 1, [Pk(Vs)]j is the jth bit of the k-bit
parity, [P (V )]j and [P (F ′)]j are the parity of the jth part of V and F ′, respectively.
The proof of the lemma can be found in Section 4.1.1.
To construct a bit-serial multiplier and/or a bit-parallel multiplier with concur-
rent error detection capability, we use updated versions of SR, SM, and VA modules
in a very similar manner as shown in Figure 6.3. Since the length of Eg′(B) is m+r
′,
the number of rounds of the bit-serial multiplier and the number of slices of the
bit-parallel multiplier are m + r′ each. Assuming that N ′ = m + r′ + k, Figure 6.6
shows a bit-parallel multiplier with CED using the hybrid scheme.
1If m + r′ is not divisible by k, one can append necessary zeros as most significant bits. See
Section 4.1 for other methods of partitioning.

































































Figure 6.6: A complete bit-parallel multiplier with CED using the hybrid scheme
6.6.2 Error Detection Using Hybrid Scheme
Having the same error model as the SIE and the DIE schemes, we develop the error
detection strategy as follows (see Figure 6.6). A k-bit parity equality checker is
placed after the VA module of each round of the bit-serial multiplier (or each slice
of the bit-parallel one). The k-bit parity equality checker computes the parities
of the k partitions of the actual value and compares them against the k predicted
parity bits. The checker gives an error signal for any inequality. If there is no
error in the circuit, the output after the last VA module is Cg′ = ABg′. If only
a maximum of one multiple-bit error occurs per round of a bit-serial multiplier or
per slice of a bit-parallel multiplier, we have:
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• if an error occurs on input B and the error is a multiple of g′, it cannot be
detected.
• if errors occur on input A and/or inside the PB multiplier and the parity of
each error in at least one partition is not zero, they are detected. If the parity
of the error in each partition is zero but the output of the last VA module is
not a multiple of g′, the errors are detected as well. Otherwise, they are not
detected.
Similar to the DIE scheme, here g′ can be preferably chosen such that its degree
is smaller than k, since this choice can decrease the area overhead of the scheme.
6.7 Simulation-Based Fault Injection
To evaluate the capability of error detection of the SIE, DIE and hybrid schemes,
we injected a large number of stuck-at faults into a C model of a GF (2163) bit-
parallel PB multiplier. The field defining polynomial was x163 + x7 + x6 + x3 + 1.
Also, the generators for SIE and DIE were g1(x) = x
8 + x4 + x3 + x2 + 1 and
g2(x) = x
3 + x + 1. For the hybrid scheme, the first input is divided into 8 parts,
i.e., an SIMP with k = 8 is used, and the second input is scaled by g′(x) = g2(x).
Since fault injection in a complete PB multiplier is extremely time consuming, we
performed fault injection in a slice of the PB multipliers. The faults were injected
at the inputs and the outputs of the gates of a slice of PB multipliers. Additionally,
a fault was injected at the bi or b
′
i input of each SM module as well.
As mentioned earlier, in a slice of a GF (2m) PB multiplier, the number of two-
input gates for SR, SM and VA modules are (ω−2) XOR gates, m AND gates and
m XOR gates, respectively, where ω is the Hamming weight of the field defining
polynomial. Additionally, except for the outputs of AND gates of the SM module,
where are the direct inputs of XOR gates of VA modules, all other inputs and
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outputs can be locations for fault injection. Therefore, considering the bi or b
′
i
input of the SM module, the number of locations for fault injection in a slice of the
PB multiplier is 3(ω − 2) + 5m + 1. Appendix A presents more information about
our procedures of the fault injections.
6.7.1 Single Stuck-at Fault Injection
For single stuck-at fault injection, we injected two faults (zero and one) at every
pin location. Hence, the total number of injected faults in a slice of the GF (2m)
PB multiplier was 6(ω−2)+10m+2. Also, we injected all above-mentioned faults
for one million and one random inputs. Table 6.1 shows the number of injected
faults for each random input along with the result of the simulation for the SIE,
DIE and hybrid schemes. The number of detected, masked and undetected faults
are 656518037, 992483822 and 999791 for SIE, 657517827, 992483823 and 0 for DIE









SIE 1766 1000001 99.85%
DIE 1856 1000001 100%
Hybrid 1784 1000001 100%
Table 6.1: Single stuck-at fault injection in a slice of a bit-parallel GF (2163) PB
multiplier
The DIE and hybrid schemes can detect 100% of single stuck-at faults. However,
percentage of error detection of SIE is less than 100%. In fact, SIE cannot detect
errors on input B. This issue was addressed in Section 5.2.
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6.7.2 Multiple Stuck-at Fault Injection
To perform multiple stuck-at fault injection, we randomly chose a number of the
locations mentioned earlier, i.e., 3(ω − 2) + 5m + 1 locations, in a slice of the PB
multiplier and then we randomly injected either stuck-at 0 fault or stuck-at 1 fault
at each chosen location. In this experiment, 500 random multiple stuck-at faults
were injected for each of 1000000 million random inputs. Since the experiment is
very time consuming (see Section 5.2), we performed this simulation only for one
slice. The number of detected and undetected faults are 498046733 and 1953267
for SIE, 498474218 and 1525782 for DIE, and 498474199 and 1525801 for Hybrid,









SIE 500 1000000 99.60935%
DIE 500 1000000 99.69485%
Hybrid 500 1000000 99.69484%
Table 6.2: Multiple stuck-at fault injection in a slice of a bit-parallel GF (2163) PB
multiplier
Comparing the PrU values and the percentage of error detection for the SIMP
and SIE schemes, one can conclude that these schemes have almost same error
detection capabilities. Accordingly, the DIE and hybrid schemes have almost same
capabilities.
6.8 Analysis of Time and Area Overheads
In this section, area and time overheads of the SIE, the DIE and the hybrid error
detection schemes are investigated.
We used the NIST recommended field defining polynomials for ECDSA f(x) =
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x163+x7+x6+x3+1 for our bit-serial implementations. Due to a resource limitation,
we could implement the bit-parallel schemes for m = 144 using the field defining
polynomial f(x) = x144 + x7 + x4 + x2 + 1. Furthermore, the code polynomial
for the SIE scheme was of degree 8 and two code polynomials required for the DIE
scheme were of degrees 8 and 3. For the hybrid scheme, eight parity bits and a code
polynomial of degree 3 were used. We described the scheme by VHDL to obtain
a realistic approximation of the area overhead. We used ModelsimTM to simulate
the design for checking its correct functionality and we implemented the scheme on
a Xilinx Spartan 3 (XC3S5000) FPGA using Xilinx ISE 7.1i.
The area overhead and the time overhead (clock period overhead or latency
overhead) of the bit-serial implementations of the SIE, the DIE, and the hybrid
schemes for a polynomial basis multiplier are given in Table 6.3. The DIE scheme
has the largest area overhead and very small time overhead. The hybrid scheme has
the largest time overhead, but still is in a reasonable range, and the smallest area
overhead. On the other hand, as mentioned earlier, the DIE and the hybrid schemes
have similar capabilities of error detection which are higher than the SIE scheme.
Therefore, for bit-serial implementations, one can choose any of the schemes based
on the area overhead, time overhead and/or error detection capability.
Bit-serial implementations
Overhead SIE DIE Hybrid
area (%) 39.71 52.94 24.33
clock cycle 0 r2 = 3 r2 = 3
clock period (%)1 0 0 12.60
latency (%) 0 1.84 14.67
1can be considered as throughput overhead.
Table 6.3: The time and the area overheads for the bit-serial implementations of
the SIE, the DIE and the hybrid schemes
The time and area overheads of bit-parallel implementations of the schemes are
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also investigated. As shown in Table 6.4, both the time and the area overheads
of the hybrid scheme are significantly lower than the SIE and the DIE schemes.
Therefore, the best choice in bit-parallel implementations is the hybrid scheme.
Note that one can reduce the number of intermediate checkers in bit-parallel im-
plementations in order to achieve lower area and time overheads but this causes a
reduction in the capability of error detection.
Bit-parallel implementations
Overhead SIE DIE Hybrid
area (%) 164.96 169.95 55.14
Time (%)1 165.71 191.19 69.98
1can be considered as maximum delay overhead.
Table 6.4: The time and the area overheads for the bit-parallel implementations of
the SIE, the DIE and the hybrid schemes
6.9 Summary
This chapter has investigated three schemes for detection of multiple-bit random
errors in binary polynomial basis multipliers using linear codes. Based on our simu-
lation, the probability of an undetected error for the L code is approximately 0.004
with eight redundant bits in the codewords. Also, the error detection capabili-
ties of the schemes are evaluated by a number of simulation-based fault injections.
Among three schemes presented in this chapter, one has a similar percentage of er-
ror detection as SIMP and the other two schemes have slightly better percentage of
error detection compared to DIMP. Furthermore, the overheads of the error detec-
tion schemes for bit-serial implementations are lower than the overhead of the dual
modular redundant scheme for a sufficient number of redundant bits. Additionally,
the time overheads of the schemes have been observed to be small, i.e., less than
15%. In bit-parallel implementations, among all three linear code based schemes,
6.9 Summary 156
the hybrid scheme has acceptable area and time overheads.
Chapter 7
Conclusions and Future Work
7.1 Summary and Conclusions
In this thesis, a number of schemes for concurrent error detection of the binary
extension field operations have been presented. For each scheme, the error detection
capability has been evaluated by simulation-based fault injections. Moreover, the
time and space complexities of each scheme have been investigated.
A number of schemes have been presented in Chapter 3, which are efficient
for pipelined architectures and are based on recomputing with shifted operands
(RESO) method. These schemes have been developed to concurrently detect errors
in polynomial, dual, type I and type II optimal normal bases arithmetic operations.
We have also presented one semi-systolic multiplier for each of above-mentioned
bases and applied the CED scheme to them. We have compared these multipliers
with a number of previously published systolic and/or semi-systolic ones. The
results show that this scheme can be considered among the best. Also, a simulation-
based fault injection has been performed for each of the multipliers. Results of the
simulations for single stuck-at faults show 100%, 100%, 99.66% and 100% error
detection for polynomial, dual, type I and type II bases multipliers, respectively.
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The simulations also show that the percentage of error detection of this scheme for
the above-mentioned multipliers against multiple stuck-at faults is 100%. Finally,
we have also commented on how RESO can be used for concurrent error correction
to deal with transient faults.
The third scheme, single-input multiple-parity (SIMP) scheme, is to detect er-
rors in bit-serial and/or bit-parallel polynomial basis multipliers. In this scheme
one input of the multiplier has been divided into a number of partitions. In this
scheme, the probability of error detection for random errors is more than 75% and
it quickly approaches unity for approximately 8 parity bits. The overhead of our
implementation tends to increase linearly as the number of parity bits increases.
Results show that the area overhead cost of the bit-serial implementation is lower
than that for the bit-parallel one. Both implementations have lower area overheads
than the traditional dual modular redundant scheme for a sufficient number of
parity bits. Additionally, the average time overhead due to the use of the scheme
in bit-parallel implementations is around 25%, while for bit-serial implementations
time overheads have been observed to be small to negligible. This scheme is also
extended to dual, type I and type II normal bases multipliers.
The fourth scheme, double-input multiple-parity (DIMP) scheme, is a concur-
rent error detection scheme for polynomial basis multipliers and can be considered
as an extension to SIMP. In this scheme, multiple parity bits are used for both in-
puts of the multiplier and hence the scheme can detect errors on both inputs and/or
inside of the multiplier. This scheme can be applied to digit-serial and bit-parallel
multipliers. Based on the simulations, the percentage of error detection of DIMP
is slightly more than SIMP. Additionally, the area overhead of DIMP is slightly
higher than SIMP. This scheme is also extended to dual, type I and type II normal
bases multipliers.
This thesis has also investigated three schemes for detection of multiple-bit ran-
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dom errors in binary polynomial basis multipliers using linear codes. Based on
our simulation, the probability of an undetected error for the L Code presented
in Chapter 6 is approximately 0.004 with eight redundant bits in the codewords.
Furthermore, the overheads of the error detection schemes for bit-serial implemen-
tations are lower than the overhead of the dual modular redundant scheme for a
sufficient number of redundant bits. Additionally, the time overheads of the schemes
have been observed to be small, i.e., less than 15%. In bit-parallel implementations,
among all three linear code based schemes, the hybrid scheme has acceptable area
and time overheads.
As mentioned earlier, the RESO based schemes are efficient for pipelined ar-
chitectures such as systolic arrays. However, the last five schemes can be applied
to both bit-serial and/or bit-parallel multipliers and in this sense they are more
general. Table 7.1 compares the last five schemes in terms of their overheads and
error detection capabilities.
From the lowest to highest
Overhead SIMP DIMP Hybrid SIE DIE
From the highest to lowest
Error detection Hybrid DIMP SIMP
capability DIE SIE
Table 7.1: Comparison of the SIMP, DIMP, SIE, DIE and hybrid schemes
7.2 Future Work
In this thesis, for the RESO based scheme, the number of required gates and their
delays have been given as estimations for time and area complexities. These esti-
mations are quite realistic, however, a more accurate and actual one can be evalu-
ated by actual VLSI implementation of those operations with CED. Moreover, as
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mentioned earlier, applying RESO based scheme to polynomial and dual bases ex-
ponentiation are not inexpensive. Therefore, in addition to suggested look-up table
based method in the thesis, other methods to decrease the overheads are desirable.
The SIMP, DIMP, SIE, DIE and hybrid schemes have been implemented in
bit-serial and/or bit-parallel fashion1. It is expected to have the area overheads of
the digit-serial implementations smaller than those of bit-parallel implementations
and larger than those of bit-serial ones. An FPGA or ASIC implementation can
give the accurate results. Furthermore, these five schemes have been applied to
conventional multipliers. Although some CED schemes were already applied to
special multipliers such as Montgomery multipliers [19], the applications of the
above-mentioned schemes to such multipliers are also desirable
The SIE, DIE and hybrid schemes may be extended to the multipliers in the
bases other than the polynomial basis. Also, one can investigate finding a non-
linear technique to be applied to the multipliers or other operations with a reduced
overhead.
It is worth mentioning that although applying the proposed schemes and in turn
adding some error checking circuitry can help to detect random errors in finite field
multipliers, it may be possible that a cryptographic systems that uses such extra
circuit-equipped multipliers becomes more vulnerable to some types of side-channel
attacks, e.g., power analysis attacks [54]. Effects of such side-channel attacks on
the error-detecting finite field multipliers proposed in thesis may be investigated in
future.
1Note that DIMP cannot be implemented in bit-serial fashion.
Appendix A
Simulation-Based Fault Injection
In this appendix, the simulation-based fault injection technique is explained. For
each proposed scheme, we performed both single-bit fault and multiple-bit fault
injections. To inject single-bit faults, we chose a slice of a bit-parallel multiplier
and considered a number of locations in that slice. Usually these locations were all
the input and output pins of the gates in the slice. As mentioned earlier, if an input
of one gate was directly connected to the output of another gate, usually one of
them was injected. Furthermore, for a set of inputs A and B, both single stuck-at
0 and single stuck-at 1 were injected at all locations. The last step was performed
for one million pairs of random inputs.
To inject one multiple-bit fault, a number of above-mentioned locations, e.g., 2
to 5 locations for some experiments, in the chosen slice were randomly selected and
a random value (zero or one) was injected at each of the selected locations. We
injected 500 multiple-bit faults for each set of inputs A and B. The previous step
was also repeated for one million pairs of random inputs.
To explain the fault injection procedure with more details, a number of pseudo
codes are given. Procedure A.1 presents the main function of either a single or a
multiple stuck-at fault injection.
161
A.1 Fault Injection in Information Redundancy Based Schemes 162
Procedure A.1 Main procedure of a fault injection
for 1000000 times do
1. Generate random input A
2. Generate random input B
3. Perform fault injection at simulated circuits with inputs A and B
end for
In the following, step 3 of Procedure A.1 is explained for different schemes.
A.1 Fault Injection in Information Redundancy
Based Schemes
The information redundancy based schemes are SIMP, DIMP, SIE, DIE and Hybrid.
For these schemes, both transient and permanent faults can be considered and they
are treated similarly. Procedure A.2 presents the single stuck-at fault injection for
these schemes.
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Procedure A.2 Single stuck-at fault injection for information redundancy based
schemes
1. FFC ←− Fault free computation
2. Inject one single stuck-at fault at one arbitrary slice {
(a) RCF ←− Result of the computation in presence of fault
(b) PP ←− Predicted parity of the output of the VA module of the slice
(c) AP ←− Actual parity of the output of the VA module of the slice
(d) if (PP 6= AP) then
an error/fault was detected
else if (RCF = FFC) then
a fault was masked
else
an error/fault was not detected
3. }until{all locations (mentioned earlier) are injected with both stack-at 0 and
stuck-at 1 faults}
4. Percentage of error detection(PED) =
No. of detected errors/faults
No of all faults− No. of masked faults
Furthermore, Procedure A.3 presents the multiple stuck-at fault injection for
these schemes.
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Procedure A.3 Multiple stuck-at fault injection for information redundancy based
schemes
1. FFC ←− Fault free computation
2. for 500 times repeat{
(a) Randomly choose a number of locations
(b) Inject randomly either zero or one at selected locations
(c) RCF ←− Result of the computation in presence of fault
(d) PP ←− Predicted parity of the output of the VA module of the slice
(e) AP ←− Actual parity of the output of the VA module of the slice
(f) if (PP 6= AP) then
an error/fault was detected
else if (RCF = FFC) then
a fault was masked
else
an error/fault was not detected}
3. PED =
No. of detected errors/faults
No of all faults− No. of masked faults
A.2 Fault Injection in RESO Based Schemes
As mentioned in Section 3.5, this scheme can detect all transient faults. Hence, we
perform the simulations for permanent faults. Procedure A.4 presents the single
stuck-at fault injection for these schemes.
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Procedure A.4 Single stuck-at fault injection for RESO based schemes
1. FFC ←− Fault free computation
2. Compute and store the encoded inputs
3. Inject one single stuck-at fault at one arbitrary row{
(a) CUI ←− Computation with unencoded inputs
(b) CEI ←− Computation with encoded inputs
(c) if (CUI 6= CEI) then
an error/fault was detected
else if (CUI = FFC) then
a fault was masked
else
an error/fault was not detected
4. }until{all locations (mentioned earlier) are injected with both stack-at 0 and
stuck-at 1 faults}
5. PED =
No. of detected errors/faults
No of all faults− No. of masked faults
Additionally, Procedure A.5 presents the multiple stuck-at fault injection for
these schemes.
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Procedure A.5 Multiple stuck-at fault injection for RESO based schemes
1. FFC ←− Fault free computation
2. Compute and store the encoded inputs
3. for 500 times repeat{
(a) Randomly choose a number of locations;
(b) Inject randomly either zero or one at selected locations
(c) CUI ←− Computation with unencoded inputs
(d) CEI ←− Computation with encoded inputs
(e) if (CUI 6= CEI) then
an error/fault was detected
else if (CUI = FFC) then
a fault was masked
else
an error/fault was not detected}
4. PED =
No. of detected errors/faults
No of all faults− No. of masked faults
It is worth mentioning that for optimal normal bases, a permutation should be
performed on the inputs of each computation to convert them from NB to ONB.
Additionally, an inverse permutation should be performed on the output of each
computation to convert it from ONB to NB (see Section 3.4.3).
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